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Abstract: The determinants of venture capital investment have attracted a significant amount of attention from 
both academics and policymakers. We use a version of the Keuschnigg–Nielsen model for venture-capital-
financed projects to condition our analysis on a reasonable set of exogenous variables but we focus on one 
determinant: financial market structure. The type of financial market structure (bank- or market-based) 
contributes substantially to explaining differences among countries with respect to the extent of venture capital 
investments in the initial business stages. We will use the cross country and time series variation from a panel of 
19 industrial countries to support the hypothesis that venture capital thrives within market-based financial 
systems and is confined to an ancillary role in bank-based systems. 
Keywords: Venture capital, financial market structure, local stock markets, panel data.  
 
Résumé : Les déterminants du capital risque attirent l’attention des politiques comme des scientifiques. Nous 
utilisons un modèle de Keuschnigg et Nielsen pour guider le choix de nos variables exogènes même si nous 
concentrons notre analyse sur un seul déterminant : la structure financière.  Le type de structure financière (basée 
sur les banques ou sur les marchés) contribue de manière substantielle à expliquer les différences selon les pays 
des premières phases d’investissement en capital risque. Nous utilisons un échantillon de 19 pays pour appuyer 
l’hypothèse que le capital risque prospère dans les économies basées sur les marchés alors qu’il est confiné dans 
un rôle secondaire dans les économies basées sur les banques. 
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1. Introduction 
The role of venture capital for seed finance and start-ups has been growing throughout recent 
decades. During the founding phase, entrepreneurs are usually short of cash and they are 
unable to finance their new projects fully out of their own pockets or the projects’ cash flow. 
If the business requires a long run-up phase, during which effort goes into product and service 
development, the cash flow may even be negative for years to come. Uncertainty surrounding 
the project’s outcome and asymmetric information about the level of effort spent by the 
entrepreneur will aggravate the difficulties to acquire external debt finance. Moreover, young 
firms – especially in innovative sectors – are often characterized by a substantial amount of 
intangible assets, which cannot be used as collateral against bank loans (Hart and Moore, 
1994), further lowering their prospects for gaining access to debt financing. In such an 
environment venture capital may provide the only potential source of finance.  
Gompers (1995) and Lerner (1995A) were among the first to point out the importance of 
venture capital in financing projects with an asymmetric informational structure between the 
entrepreneur and the investor and a high degree of uncertainty, though the practice of 
providing venture capital dates back to the first years after World War II (Gompers and 
Lerner, 1998). Since then venture capital has emerged as a distinct financial branch with 
newly raised seed and start-up capital corresponding to 0.5 percent of gross fixed capital 
formation of the US private non-financial sector.  
The USA is not only the place where venture capital was invented; it is also the nation with 
the world’s most developed venture capital market. This may be attributable to path 
dependence of financial markets, favorable capital gains taxation, the long-lasting effect of 
allowing pension funds to invest in venture capital, the reputation of a set of well-known fund 
managers, or the very well-developed institutions that track the returns of venture capital 
funds (Gompers and Lerner, 1998). Nevertheless, despite a rather homogenous legal and 
economic system and a common understanding in the society about the importance of risk 
taking and entrepreneurship, the activity of US venture funds is extremely concentrated in 
four states. California, Massachusetts, New York, and Texas account for 57 percent of the 
total venture capital invested (cf. Gompers and Lerner table 3.2). If we rank US states by their 
ratio of invested venture capital to state gross domestic product (GDP), the ten states with the 
highest ratio comprise New England and surroundings, California, Colorado, Oregon, and 
Pennsylvania. Of these states only Colorado and Oregon show up as regional outliers. 
Gompers and Lerner (1998) show in a cross section of US states that industrial and academic 
research and development spending is significantly related to both the number of firms 
receiving venture capital as well as the amount of venture capital. Their regression explains 
about 43 percent of the inter-state variation in per-capita venture capital investment, although 
the ratio of venture capital to state-GDP varies between 0.3 (Hawaii) and 6.4 (Vermont) 
percent.  
Given the large differences across US states it may seem curious to look for a relation 
between financial market structure and the extent of venture capital finance. Moreover, Allen 
and Gale (2000) argue in their comparison of financial systems that financial intermediaries 
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provide alternative substitutes for financial markets and offer institutional arrangements that 
correct existing market failures. Therefore, market-based systems are not on a priori grounds a 
more efficient mechanism to allocate capital within an economy. Their reasoning is supported 
empirically by Beck and Levine (2002) who test the relative merits of financial structure in 
fostering economic performance. Overall, they conclude that industrial growth patterns and 
the efficiency of capital allocation do not vary systematically over countries with different 
financial structure, rather, the overall level of financial development and the efficiency of the 
legal system are more useful predictors for the number of establishments and value-added 
growth. Beck and Levine (2004) and Hahn (2008) extend this result to aggregate economic 
growth and show that: both well-developed stock markets and financial intermediaries 
support economic growth.  
There are at least three arguments challenging this result. We have already mentioned the lack 
of recyclable assets in start-ups emphasized by Hart and Moore (1994) as a brake to debt 
finance for high-technology start-ups. Additionally, Allen and Gale (1999) offer a more 
nuanced view of the information processing capacities of markets versus intermediaries and 
Black and Gilson (1998) underline the importance of returning control rights from the venture 
capitalist to the entrepreneur upon exit.  
In the model of Allen and Gale (1999) markets are good at collecting and aggregating diverse 
opinions about uncertain business projects associated with innovative new technologies. They 
argue that stock markets provide incentives for a large number of investors to monitor the 
management’s performance. This activity is useful for production processes with (1) long 
periods between the adoption of the business plan and the observed success or failure, and 
where (2) rapid technological change is highly relevant (Allen, 1993). Under these 
circumstances there will be very little consensus among investors about the effectiveness of 
the new technology or the best way to run the firm. This is less a consequence of differing 
access to data rather than investors interpreting existing data in various ways and forming 
diverging opinions on efficient contingent management actions.  
Financial intermediaries, on the other hand, benefit from increasing returns of scale in 
processing standardized and homogenous information (Diamond, 1984). Because banks often 
assess similar decision-making processes in conventional firms, they benefit from returns of 
scale in project evaluation and monitoring the continuity of interest and redemption payments. 
This knowledge, however, offers no advantage for the evaluation of seed or start-up firms in 
new industries with a short history of data or no comparable track record. On the contrary, in 
such an environment markets have an advantage over intermediaries because they offer the 
opportunity for a large number of people to participate directly in the investment decision. 
Although it is costly for investors to acquire the relevant information individually, the 
aggregation of individual information sets and expectations through markets increases the 
number of innovative projects gaining access to finance (Allen and Gale, 1999). It is only 
when beliefs among investors become correlated, i. e. their evaluations of firms converge to a 
common value, that the delegation of investment decisions to an intermediary becomes 
profitable.  
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Black and Gilson (1998) give a completely different explanation for a positive relation 
between market-based systems and the extent of venture capital finance. Their argument is 
based on corporate control rights as they point out the explicit and implicit contractual 
arrangements between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs on the design of the future exit 
strategy. Black and Gilson’s argument is based on the assumption that entrepreneurs place 
substantial private value on control rights over the company. The exit of venture capitalists 
through initial public offerings (IPO), for example, has different implications for the future 
control of a start-up firm as compared to the acquisition by an incumbent firm. By agreeing to 
a contract setting out an IPO as the preferred exit mode, the venture capitalist signals credibly 
to return control rights to the successful entrepreneur upon exit. For example, guaranteed 
board membership of the venture capitalist or veto power over business decisions typically 
cease after an IPO, whether or not the venture capitalist sells any shares at the IPO (Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2003). Covenants of the venture capital contract will be substituted by weaker 
control rights of regular shareholders and often the entrepreneur retains the majority of shares. 
In case of an acquisition, on the other hand, control rights will be permanently withdrawn 
from the entrepreneur. Whereas the explicit return of control rights to the entrepreneur is 
difficult to implement in a venture capital contract, due to the nebulous definition of success, 
the fixing of an IPO as the preferred exit mode provides an attractive implicit contractual 
arrangement. The feasibility of an IPO as the exit route obviously depends on the structure of 
financial markets. In the extreme case of a completely bank-based economy such an implicit 
arrangement about the transfer of control rights would be impossible; in mixed systems IPOs 
are less likely than they are in market-based economies with vibrant stock markets.  
If market-based systems are actually better at aggregating information and returning control 
rights to entrepreneurs, why are – even in the USA – acquisitions still an important way to 
exit ventures? Cochrane (2005) provides evidence that about 50 percent of the number of 
exits from US ventures use the acquisition mode and that the modal value of the rate of return 
distribution is about the same for IPOs and acquisitions, though acquisitions realize more 
negative or below-average returns, indicating a selection bias and pushing the mean rate of 
return for acquisitions below that of IPOs. Norbäck and Persson (2009) compare the total 
value of acquisitions with that of IPOs. Over the period from 1999 through 2005 they show 
that in the US market the value of acquisitions always surpassed that of IPOs: by a factor of as 
much as five around the year 2000. As an explanation they suggest a model of venture capital 
finance that threatens rents achieved by incumbents on oligopolistic markets. Venture capital 
backed innovations are carried out because these rents can be extracted by selling the 
successful venture to one of the incumbent firms. This exit channel does not depend on the 
structure of financial markets but relies on positive strategic product market effects on the 
sales price of the venture.  
In this paper we will extend the anecdotal evidence for a positive relation between market-
based financial markets and the extent of venture capital finance presented by Black and 
Gilson (1998). They present several indicators for seven industrial countries and show that 
bank-based nations commit a comparatively lower amount to venture capital. Moreover, those 
investments tend to be concentrated in latter stage financing rather than in seed money or 
start-ups. We will use the cross country and time series variation from a panel of industrial 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.25
 5 
 
countries to support the hypothesis that venture capital thrives within market-based financial 
systems and is confined to an ancillary role in bank-based systems.  
As a measure for financial market structure we use the index suggested by Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine (1999) as an additional explanatory variable in a panel regression explaining the 
share of seed and start-up investments in tangible and intangible capital formation. The index 
by Kunt and Levine is a continuous number increasing in the extent of market-based features. 
We can thus go beyond the comparison of extreme cases like the United Kingdom’s largely 
equity-financed capital formation during the industrial revolution (Michie, 1987) or 
Germany’s and Japan’s strength in industries pioneered in other countries (Allen and Gale, 
2000, p.408). Mixed financial systems are the norm and the financial market index enables us 
to include information from all countries with records on seed and start-up venture capital.  
We build our empirical model on the theoretical model of Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2005). 
This model describes the complicated fabric between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists 
and distinguishes between venture-capital- and bank-financed projects. Their model provides 
us with the identification of the relevant variables determining the equilibrium level of 
venture-capital-based investments. The conditioning assumptions derived from it suggest a 
regression equation which allows us to provide robust evidence for the hypothesis that 
market-based economies nourish venture capital.  
There are other papers related to our topic but they focus more strongly on the relation 
between financial structure and research and development spending or other measures of 
innovative activity. Lumme et al. (1994) for example, compare the balance sheet structure and 
growth performance of small firms in the United Kingdom and Finland. They find that UK-
domiciled firms use more equity finance and grow faster than small Finnish firms. Houben 
and Kakes (2002) show in a cross-country analysis that the positive effects of innovation in 
information and communication technologies on productivity growth were mainly 
experienced by market-based economies.  
Evidence of cash constraints for small firms with large research and development 
expenditures also supports the hypothesis that young innovative enterprises predominantly 
use equity markets as their marginal source of funds (cf. Hall (2002) for a summary of 
supportive empirical material). Brown et al. (2009) suggest that between 1994 and 2004 the 
USA experienced a finance-driven cycle in research and development spending concentrated 
within seven high-tech industries and mainly accounted for by young firms (defined as having 
had their IPO fewer than 15 years earlier). Based on firm-level panel data, Brown et al. (2009) 
show that research and development spending of young firms in the USA depends 
significantly on their access to either cash flow or external equity. Martinsson (2010) extends 
these results to young publicly traded high-tech firms throughout Europe and shows that firms 
incorporated in the United Kingdom – a market-based economy – experienced a supply shift 
of external equity in the late 1990s and used this money to increase research and development 
expenditures. New firms from continental Europe, on the other hand, received capital 
predominantly from internal cash flow and invested to a significantly lower degree into 
research and development.  
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In the following section we provide a short description of the financial structure index and an 
initial explorative view on the relation between financial market structure and the extent of 
venture capital investment. Section three sketches out the theoretical model for venture-
capital-financed investment and derives the regression equation. Subsequently we present the 
data and estimation method. Section 5 presents the results, which are followed by the 
conclusion.  
2. Characteristics of Market- and Bank-based Systems  
The relative development of bank-based versus market-based financial systems depends on 
various economic and institutional factors. In empirical work it is convenient to have a 
composite measure that conveys the degree to which a financial system is bank-based or 
market-based in a single variable. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) propose such a measure. 
This index has been subsequently used by various authors as an explanatory variable for 
economic growth, bank profitability, corporate finance, etc. (Kunt and Levine, 2004).  
The financial structure index compares the level of financial activity channeled through the 
stock market to that facilitated by private banks. Invariably, such a measure relies on relative 
volumes of transactions using either means of finance. The index combines indicators on 
domestic stock market capitalization, deposits at banks, stock market turnover, private credit 
by banks, and bank overhead costs into a real number, i.e. it is continuous and not bounded. 
The higher the value of the index is, the more market-based the financial system of an 
economy, cf. the appendix for a detailed description.  
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) use data on financial development and structure from the 
World Bank covering in its initial version the period 1990 through 1999 on an annual basis. 
We use the current release of the World Bank dataset to extend Kunt and Levine’s measure 
through 2008.** The index documents the degree of diversity of financial systems across 
developed countries. This is in line with many comparative studies of financial systems, 
which demonstrate persistent differences in household and business investment behavior in 
the OECD countries (Kunt and Levine, 2004, Ch. II.3). The ranking reveals the prevalence of 
bank-based financial systems in continental Europe, with Switzerland as a notable exception, 
while financial systems in the Anglo-Saxon countries are heavily market-based.  
Figure 1 compares the average value of the index for the original period 1990 through 1999 
on the horizontal axis with the averages of our new values for the period 2000 through 2008 
on the vertical axis. The 45-degree line indicates countries with a stable financial system. 
Countries above this line experienced a movement toward a market-based financial system, 
countries below this line moved instead toward the direction of a bank-based economy. 
Overall, most countries show little variation over time. Other than Australia and the 
Netherlands the earlier taxonomy of countries fully prevails. Both countries show values close 
to zero in both periods. This indirectly corroborates findings by Bruno and De Bonis (2009) 
of missing convergence between financial systems across developed countries.  
                                                     
** “A New Database on Financial Development and Structure”, see: http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0 
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Countries showing noticeable changes in their index value comprise Finland and the USA 
with a shift toward a more market-based system and Denmark with a movement toward bank-
based finance. In the case of Denmark this development is due to a tripling of the volume of 
deposits and a quadrupling of deals in credits relative to GDP, which was not fully matched 
by increases in components related to the stock market. Finland, on the other hand, saw a 
surge in stock market capitalization and turnover, while all bank-related components 
stagnated. The development of the US index is dominated by a swift increase in stock market 
turnover after 1999 and to a lesser degree by higher stock market capitalization as compared 
to the first half of the 1990s.  
The amount of venture capital investment varies substantially across countries. In order to 
make it comparable, we normalize venture capital investments by gross fixed capital 
formation and business enterprise expenditures on research and development. This 
normalization approximates the share of venture capital investments in total tangible capital 
formation and the intangible assets accumulated by young innovative firms throughout the 
year (see next section for a more detailed description and reason for this measure). Figure 2 
shows the relation between venture capital finance and market structure across countries using 
average values over the sample period. It broadly confirms the hypothesis that market-based 
systems nourish venture capital as they tend to use venture capital more intensively. Only 
Canada appears to be an outlier in Figure 2 with a balanced mix of bank- and market-based 
financial services but the highest VC ratio in the sample. Before we use our estimation results 
to refine this evidence, we will sketch out the relevant parts of the model on venture capital 
finance by Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2005) that helps us to restrict the parameter space.  
3. Theoretical background and model specification  
We use a version of the model for venture capital finance by Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2005) 
which already includes important policy variables like taxes on capital gains and investment 
subsidies. This model is based on the assumption that venture capital is a scarce and 
expensive resource of finance for start-up firms. It is scarce mainly because venture capitalists 
provide additional managerial expertise, detailed knowledge of the industry, accumulated 
personal experience, and a good reputation. Acquiring these capabilities and the reputation to 
become a successful venture capitalist takes time and is costly. The model distinguishes 
between bank and venture-capital-financed innovative firms but leaves the production of 
traditional goods aside. The main parties in the model are entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists. The entrepreneurs possess business ideas and technical know-how for launching a 
new business but they lack advanced managerial experience and funds to implement their 
ideas and start up their firms. The source of venture capital, on the other hand, is not specified 
in the model.  
The model is based on a matching equilibrium between entrepreneurs searching for finance 
and venture capitalists searching for promising deals. Both parties have to devote effort to 
make a start-up profitable but cannot observe the level of effort actually dedicated to the start-
up. Specifically, the entrepreneur expends effort, e, to run a start-up firm successfully. Effort 
is measured as a bivariate variable taking either values of zero or one. At high levels of effort 
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e=1 the probability of success for a start-up rises from 0 to p0, whereas at low levels of effort 
e=0, the start-up fails. Positive effort has constant effort costs on the side of the entrepreneur, 
β, which must be covered by the project’s return. Since the level of effort, e, cannot be 
observed in advance and the entrepreneur has no credible signaling device, the contract design 
between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur must take account of shirking. 
Entrepreneurs can choose between bank and venture capital finance. In the case of bank 
finance, risk-neutral entrepreneurs maximize their expected profits, πB, subject to a 
participation constraint for the bank (PCB) and an incentive constraint for the entrepreneur 
(ICE). The participation constraint implies that the bank breaks even after providing the credit 
to finance tangible physical investment expenditures, I, net of public investment subsidies, z, 
and the base salary for the entrepreneur, w . At the same time, entrepreneurs need an incentive 
constraint on their side, inducing a high level of effort. In the case of bank finance, the profit 
from the start-up results from the difference between revenues and the payback of the credit, 
D, plus the base salary, w , of the entrepreneur. The profit from engaging in a start-up, πB, 
must be at least as large as the opportunity wage of employment in the traditional goods 
producing sector, W, plus the costs of effort, β, from securing a successful start-up. The 
maximization problem for the expected profit in case of bank finance is  
 ( ) ( )( ) WewDVepB
e
+≥+−−= βτπ 01max  (1) 
 s.t. PCB ( ) wIzDep +−≥ 10  
 ICE ( ) ( ) 01 0 ≥−−− βτ DVp  , 
The entrepreneur’s profit is measured after tax with τ representing the capital gains tax rate. 
For simplicity the base salary is taxed at the same rate. The banking market is assumed to be 
competitive. Banks will only receive a payback if the start-up is successful. Therefore, the 
binding participation constraint for banks under high effort e=1 produces the minimum 
expected repayment that banks will accept. The binding incentive constraint induces the 
entrepreneur to expend significant effort on the start-up because the after-tax pay-out fully 
compensates for the costs of effort. By substituting the binding participation constraint into 
the profit function, assuming that the incentive constraint binds, and furthermore assuming 
that free entry eliminates any excess surplus over wages in the traditional sector, W, the 
maximum profit under bank finance is  
 ( ) ( )( ) WIzVpB +=−−−= βτπ 11 0  ,  (2) 
i. e. the after-tax operating surplus of the start-up is equal to the sum of effort costs and the 
opportunity wage in the traditional sector. This relation also fixes the price of innovative 
goods at 
 ( )
( ) I
p
z
p
WV
00
1
1
−+−
+= τ
β  .  (3) 
Venture capital finance differs from bank finance because venture capitalists provide funds 
and value-enhancing managerial advice to the start-up, whereas banks offer only credit and 
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lack managerial knowledge. The venture capitalist invests advisory effort, a, into the start-up. 
This intervention increases the quality of the product and allows the firm to acquire a 
premium q(a)>1 over the general market price, V, for the standard quality of the innovative 
good. The standard quality is supplied by bank-financed innovative firms. The function q(a) 
has positive but diminishing returns in managerial advice, a. Advice implies intangible 
managerial effort costs, γa, on the side of the venture capitalist.  
This simple set-up requires a straight equity contract anticipating that both participants have 
to expend enough effort in order to make the start-up successful. Because the entrepreneur has 
no own funds, the venture capitalist must pay for all costs of the start-up including the front-
loaded base salary, Ew . By paying the start-up costs, the venture capitalist acquires a share 
(1-s) in the start-up and participates with this share in the upside potential of the firm. The 
entrepreneur owns the remaining share s of the start-up. Profits for the entrepreneur, πE, and 
the venture capitalist, πF, are given by,  
 ( ) ( )[ ] BEE wVaqsp πτπ ≥+−= 01    (4) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] awIzVaqps EF γτπ =−−−−−= 111 0  ,  (5) 
with the joint surplus Χ, 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
a
aIzVaqp
FBE
B
γπππ
πγτ
−+−=
−−−−−=Χ 11 0  ,  (6) 
being shared between both partners according to the solution of the joint maximization 
problem  
 ( ) ( )ξξ γπππ aFBE
aews E
−− −1
,,,
max  (7) 
 s.t. PCE WBE ≥−≥− βπβπ  
  ICE ( ) ( ) βτ ≥− Vaqsp01  
 ICF ( )( ) ( ) γτ ≥′−− Vaqps 011  , 
where ξ represents the bargaining power of the venture capitalist. The solution of this problem 
follows backward induction. Agents choose their effort levels after the terms of the contract 
have been fixed and all start-up costs are sunk. The venture capitalist benefits from the value 
added by his advice at the rate (1-s) and chooses a higher effort level, a, such that ICF 
becomes binding. The function q’(a) is the derivative of the premium over the general market 
price with respect to the venture capitalist’s effort. Solving the ICF for the level of advice 
gives  
 ( )[ ] ( )( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−++−′=
−
IzWs
qa
111
1
τβ
γ  .  (8) 
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The share of the entrepreneur in the start-up results from the binding ICE constraint  
 ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )IaqzWaqs −−++= 11 τβ
β  .  (9) 
If this equality holds, significant effort by the entrepreneur is assured and equations (8) and 
(9) simultaneously determine the equity share and the extent of managerial advice. For given 
a and s, the venture capitalist will minimize the front-loaded base salary such that the 
participation constraint of the entrepreneur becomes binding. The maximum after-tax joint 
surplus for a deal is  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]{ }aIzWaq γτβτ −−−++−−=Χ 1111  .  (10) 
The front-loaded base salary, W, is determined by bargaining between the entrepreneur and 
the venture capitalist. The joint after-tax surplus will be shared according to the bargaining 
power as ( )Χ−=− ξππ 1BE  and Χ=− ξγπ aF .  
The search equilibrium crucially depends on the number of potential entrepreneurs, E , and 
the number of venture capitalists, F, which are fixed in the model. E  is set at a high-enough 
level to ensure that there will always be ‘excess’ entrepreneurs being sent back to bank 
finance. This creates free entry, eliminates profits for bank-financed start-ups, and fixes the 
after-tax base salary at the level of the opportunity wage in the traditional sector, ( ) Ww E =−τ1 , while still inducing significant effort on the side of the entrepreneur.  
In their search for deals venture capitalists make only a fraction vF of financing offers. 
Consequently, the number of random matchings between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists 
depends on equilibrium market tightness, θ :  
 
vF
E=θ  ,  (11) 
i. e. the ratio between potential entrepreneurs and the number of financing offers by venture 
capitalists. The matching probability, f(θ)  
 ( )
vF
Ef =θ  ,  (12) 
is the fraction of venture capital offers resulting in a deal. Both parties need an incentive to 
undertake search activity. The entrepreneur will engage in search activity for venture capital 
finance if the expected gain over a bank-financed project covers at least the costs of search 
effort k,  
 ( ) ( ) kf ≥Χ−ξθ
θ 1  ,  (13) 
The left-hand side of this equation combines the probability of finding venture capital finance 
for a start-up with the entrepreneur’s share in the joint after-tax surplus. If the expected gain 
from searching exceeds the search cost, k, a potential entrepreneur will start looking for 
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venture capital finance. The venture capitalist, on the other hand, maximizes the expected 
surplus net of search costs, δ(vi), with respect to the individual number of offers vi,  
 ( ) ( )iiv vfvi δξθ −Χmax  ,  (14) 
which results in the following optimality condition for offers by the venture capitalist, 
 ( ) ( )ivf δξθ ′=Χ  ,  (15) 
with δ’(vi) representing the derivative of search costs with respect to the number of individual 
offers. Due to the assumption that the potential number of entrepreneurs is large enough, only 
a fraction of the potential entrepreneurs, E , will be able to close a deal. For this reason, any 
excess of the expected revenue of a deal over search costs will be eliminated and inequality 
(13) will hold exactly. Substituting the matching probability from equation (12) and market 
tightness from equation (11) into equation (13) gives the number of deals as a function of 
search costs, the entrepreneur’s share in after-tax joint profit, and the potential number of 
entrepreneurs,  
 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]{ }EaIzWaq k
EkE
γτβξ
ξ
−−−++−−=
Χ−=
1111
1
 ,  (16) 
Because we assume that the number of potential entrepreneurs always exceeds the number of 
deals, search costs have to be smaller than the share of the entrepreneur in the joint after-tax 
surplus. If the start-up succeeds the firm will produce one unit of output, if it fails the level of 
production will be zero. Accounting for differences in quality between goods produced by 
bank and venture capital financed start-ups, the aggregate supply will be ( )( )EaqBp +0  and 
consumers will spend the amount G on innovative goods. Due to separability and linearity of 
the utility function the demand for innovative goods is independent of income. The demand 
function depends on the price of traditional goods (numeraire set to 1), the price of innovative 
goods, V, and the quality premium, q(a), thus ( )( )aqVGG ,=  and the number of bank 
financed start-ups follows from the market clearing condition for innovative goods,  
 ( )EaqpBpG 00 +=  ,  (17) 
which can be solved for B,  
 
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]{ }EaIzWaq kaqpp aqVG
Eaqp
p
aqVGB
γτβξ −−−++−−−=
−=
1111
,
,
0
0
0
0  .  (18) 
We are interested in the effect of the financial market structure on the extent of venture capital 
finance. The model by Keuschnigg – Nielsen (2005) shows that the share of venture capital 
investment in total investment for innovative goods depends on  
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 ,  (19) 
where V and a can be eliminated by using equations (3), (8), and (9). According to this model 
the share of venture capital backed start-ups depends on unobservable and observable 
exogenous variables. The unobservable variables are search costs, k, and effort costs, β, of 
entrepreneurs. Also the bargaining power, ξ, the effort level of venture capitalists, a, and their 
costs of advice, γ, cannot be observed. On the other hand, opportunity wages, W, capital gains 
tax rates, τ, investment subsidies, z, the number of potential entrepreneurs, E , and physical 
investment, I, can be observed, even the probability of success, p0, may be approximated by 
actual default rates or business confidence indicators. We thus approximate equation (19) by 
an equation relating the ratio of venture capital investment, VC, to the sum of gross fixed 
capital formation in total economy, I, and business enterprise expenditures on research and 
development, RD:  
 ( ) ( )IFMSpEzWfRDI VC ,,,,, 0τ=+  ,  (20) 
We approximate the entrepreneur’s salary by expenditures on research and development as a 
measure for total run-up costs which have to be paid up front regardless of the success of a 
venture. Other components of intangible capital formation could be added to research and 
development spending but comparable data are not available for our sample of countries. 
Furthermore, spending on research and development is likely to form the most important part 
of intangible capital formation of young innovative start-ups. On top of all variables 
characterizing the equilibrium value of venture capital in equation (20) we will use the index 
for financial market structure suggested by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999), IFMS, as an 
indicator for the prevalence of market- versus bank-based financial systems in a country. The 
panel structure of our sample will allow us to control for the effect of unobservable time 
invariant variables as they provide part of the explanation for cross-country variation in the 
extent of venture capital finance, e. g. differences in legal systems, the size and age of pension 
funds, labor market regulations affecting hiring and firing decisions, and cultural attitudes 
toward entrepreneurship.  
4. Data and Estimation  
We use equation (20) to choose the data transformation for our dependent variable and the set 
of explanatory variables to test our hypothesis of the relevance of financial market structure to 
the extent of venture capital finance. We restrict venture capital to investments in the seed and 
start-up phase of firms. The European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) and national 
associations provide data on seed and start-up investments of venture capital funds. Since the 
amount of venture capital clearly depends on the overall size of the economy we normalize 
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venture capital investments by the sum of gross fixed-capital formation and business 
enterprise expenditures on research and development. Gross fixed-capital formation 
corresponds to investments into physical structures and equipment, whereas business 
expenditures on research and development are the most important part of intangible capital 
formation by small innovative start-ups. This normalization provides a useful basis from 
which to assess the relevance of venture capital financing and gives a comparable measure of 
venture capital intensity across countries varying between zero (Greece, 2005 and 2008) and 
3.1 percent (United Kingdom, 2006) (cf. Table 1). On average the 19 countries in our sample 
have a venture capital ratio of 0.2 percent.  
We measure the opportunity wage of entrepreneurs in alternative activities outside small 
innovative firms by the log of the net wage used to compute the denominator of the venture 
capital ratio. So we assume that entrepreneurs are able to achieve above-average incomes 
after tax if they were to work in traditional firms which is coherent with our definition of 
potential entrepreneurs as graduates with tertiary education. The tax rate in our application is 
the ratio of revenues from capital gains and corporate profits to GDP, rather than the statutory 
tax rate. This modification allows for the substantial scope of tax avoidance created by 
opportunities in the tax code to lower the tax base.  
Public investment subsidies can be granted either as direct payments or as tax relief. We use 
the share of business expenditures on research and development (BERD) financed directly by 
government subsidies. This share is on average almost 8 percent and assumes substantial 
values for some of the countries. The USA, for example, subsidized 26.4 percent of BERD by 
providing public funds (1989). France financed more than 22 percent (1991). In recent years 
this share declined for all countries starting from high levels in the beginning of the 1990s, 
with Spain alone starting to increase direct research and development (R&D) subsidies after 
2002. Tax relief, on the other hand, is not as easy to compute because the estimate of foregone 
taxes relies on assessments of the reduced tax base and the tax rate applicable to it. The 
OECD publishes the B-index which is equal to the after-tax cost of US Dollar 1 spent on 
R&D divided by one minus the corporate income tax rate. We use 1 minus the B-index as our 
indicator of the size of public R&D subsidies. Our sample shows considerable variation 
around the mean of 0.13. While for Germany and Italy the indicator of tax subsidies is 
negative and thus shows a tax burden rather than a subsidy, Greece had values of 1 between 
1989 and 1996 indicating full public subsidization of R&D spending during this period; 
afterwards the Greek tax system quickly moved toward an almost neutral stance.  
Industrialized countries implement several programs to foster entrepreneurship by 
encouraging start-ups. Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2005) propose such programs as alternative 
promising instruments. Data on entrepreneurship promotion is hard to come by, the closest 
approximation we find are public expenditures on start-up incentives for unemployed persons 
allocated within labor market programs. These labor market programs support the 
unemployed who begin a career as self-employed persons, by providing courses, for example, 
on management fundamentals. Continued unemployment benefits during the first phase of 
opening shop constitute the main part of expenditures, however, so our measure does not fully 
reflect start-up incentives relevant for venture capital projects. Additionally, entry 
liberalization has been shown by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) to be positively related to 
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output growth while Alesina et al. (2005) provide evidence for a close connection with 
investment spending. We therefore use two indicators collected by the Worldbank reflecting 
the ease of starting a business as alternative measures for entrepreneurship promotion. First, 
the time to start a business measures the number of calendar days needed to complete the 
procedures to legally operate a business. The time needed to open a business varies markedly 
within our sample between 2 (Australia) and 114 (Sweden) days. Second, we use the costs of 
start-up as indicated by expenses needed to register a business with national authorities. The 
highest start-up costs are in Greece while Denmark and Ireland require minimum payments.  
The number of potential entrepreneurs also determines the amount of venture capital in an 
economy. We use two different measures for this variable. First, we collect all graduates with 
tertiary education in the fields of business administration, life sciences, physical sciences, 
mathematics and statistics, computing, engineering and engineering trades, manufacturing and 
processing from the OECD data base on education and relate this quantity to the working age 
population. Second, we use the indicator by Barro and Lee (2010) covering persons with 
completed tertiary education in the population aged 20 and older. The OECD indicator is 
more narrowly concentrated in fields that have a closer relation to venture-capital financed 
projects but the data by Barro and Lee have the advantage of covering a longer period.  
Although the probability of success of a specific venture is unobservable we use two variables 
to bring information about the aggregate business climate and therefore the average 
probability of success into our model. One indicator for general business conditions is the 
standardized business confidence indicator from the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators 
database. This confidence indicator is comparable across countries and calculated from 
industrial confidence indicators based on company surveys. The OECD centers the 
confidence indicator at 100, which is reflected by the mean in our sample as shown in 
Table 1. An alternative measure for general business conditions is the insolvency ratio, 
measured as the number of insolvencies per 10,000 active companies. Contrary to the 
business confidence indicator, the insolvency ratio should be inversely related to the 
probability of success.  
In order to achieve comparability of variables across time and countries we either work with 
ratios or we transform variables into real terms by dividing through the output deflator. 
Additionally, we transform all real values into Euros by using the year 2000 exchange rate 
vis-à-vis the national currency. The sample covers 19 countries (cf. Table 1 for a list of 
countries) and the period 1989 through 2009, though many variables are missing for some 
periods. As can be seen in Table 1 only corporate tax rates are available for all years, on the 
other hand, observations for costs of start-ups and time to start a business are particularly 
scarce. The resulting unbalanced panel which we can use for the regression is thus 
considerably shorter.  
We follow Beck and Levine (2002) and use the average of the index of financial market 
structure in our regression model. Averaging is suggested by the stability of financial market 
structures within a country over time (cf. Figure 1) and by the associated loss in the precision 
of estimates. This has some consequences for the regression methodology. The regression 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.25
 15 
 
model for Yit the TN×1 vector of venture capital ratios to be explained by the model has the 
form:  
 itiiitit ZXY εαγβ +++=  ,   (21) 
where Xit and Zi denote TN×k and TN×g matrices, respectively, whose subscripts indicate 
variation over countries (i=1,…, N) and time (t=1, …, T). Observations are ordered first by 
individual and then by time. As a consequence each column of Zi has blocks of T identical 
entries representing constant country specific variables. The scalar k indicates the number of 
time varying explanatory variables in Xit, while g represents the number of constant 
explanatory variables in Zi. The TN×1 vector αi contains country specific effects reflecting the 
unobservable variables of the model presented above, i. e. search and effort costs, bargaining 
power, and the effort level of venture capitalists in country i. The disturbance εit has a mean of 
zero, constant variance 2εσ  conditional on Xit and Zi, and is assumed to be uncorrelated with 
the columns of Xit, Zi, and αi.  
In this case we cannot use a fixed effects panel estimator to estimate γ because the constant 
financial market structure will be wiped out by the within-transformation. Furthermore, as our 
hypothesis implies a positive relation between market-based systems and the extent of venture 
capital, we expect a positive correlation between both variables at the country level. This 
correlation violates the assumption of the random effects estimators that latent country 
effects, αi, be independent of both constant, Zi, and time varying, Xit, explanatory variables. In 
this case two methods can be applied. Hausman and Taylor (1981) suggest a generalized 
instrumental variable estimator and Plümper and Troeger (2007) refine the two-step 
procedure proposed by Hsiao (1986) with a third step.  
The Hausman and Taylor estimator requires a partition of both time varying, Xit, and constant 
,Zi, explanatory variables into exogenous and endogenous variables. Exogenous variables are 
assumed to be uncorrelated to latent country effects while endogenous variables are correlated 
with country effects. All variables in Xit and Zi not being correlated with the latent country 
effect, αi, serve as valid instruments for the columns of Zi that are correlated with latent 
country effects, in our case the financial market structure. A necessary condition for 
identification of the parameter vectors β and γ is that the number of exogenous time varying 
variables is greater than or equal to the number of endogenous constant variables and that 
there is at least one constant exogenous variable in Zi. In our case, only the financial market 
structure, IFMSi, is related to the latent country effect while for all other variables in Xit we 
have no a priori reason to believe in any correlation. Thus the necessary condition k>1 is 
fulfilled. Apart from the financial market structure none of the other explanatory variables is 
constant over time. So we have to take the average value for at least one of the time-varying 
exogenous variables in equation (20) in order to achieve identification. We choose the 
corporate tax rate for this purpose because changes in the tax code are certainly exogenous to 
the latent country effect in the venture capital ratio and because the average corporate tax rate 
tends to be stable over time. This can also be seen by the low variation in the corporate tax 
rate which has one of the smallest coefficients of variation in our sample. In the following we 
refer to estimates based on the Hausman and Taylor estimator as HT.  
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The estimator suggested by Plümper and Troeger does not rely on a priori assumptions on the 
exogeneity of explanatory variables. Instead, they propose a three-step procedure based on the 
fixed-effects estimator for equation (21) excluding constant explanatory variables Zi in the 
first step. From the fixed effects estimator of the first step we can derive an estimate of the 
latent country effect, iαˆ , which will be regressed on the constant explanatory variables in the 
second step:  
 iii Z ηϕα +=ˆ  . (22) 
The only interesting result from the second step regression is the residual, ηi, which will be 
used in the third step regression as an additional explanatory variable. The third step uses 
pooled OLS to estimate β and γ in equation (21) amended by ηi. In the following, we will 
refer to estimates based on the Plümper and Troeger estimator by PT.  
Both estimators, Hausman and Taylor’s as well as Plümper and Troeger’s, rely on N→∞ 
asymptotics, which cannot be expected to hold in a cross-country sample. We therefore use 
bootstrapped estimators of the covariance matrix to compute the standard errors in Tables 3 
and 4.  
5. Results  
We want to test the hypothesis whether venture capitalists are able to raise and invest more 
funds for seed and start-up finance in market-based financial systems. For this purpose we run 
a series of regressions based on model (21) employing two estimation methods that allow for 
a combination of time-variable and time-invariant information in the panel. Table 2 confirms 
that our results do not suffer from excessive multicollinearity and Tables 3 and 4 summarize 
our results. The latter tables show the point estimates and indicate whether they differ 
significantly from zero. The bottom of each table presents the number of observations, the 
coefficient of determination, and the p-value for a Ramsey-Reset test. We distinguish between 
models using the full set of explanatory variables (1, 2, 5, 6, 9, and 10) as suggested by 
equation (20). This approach leaves us with only 73 observations for the 19 countries. The 
low number of observations is mainly due to the scarcity of our two indicators on the public 
policy stance toward easy and low-cost registration of companies with the authorities. If we 
drop those two indicators we can almost double the sample size to 128 observations. Models 
3, 4, 7, and 8 use the reduced variable set with a higher number of observations. The Ramsey 
test shows that only models 3 and 7 potentially suffer from misspecification.  
The first line of Table 3 shows point estimates and significance levels for the Kunt and Levine 
index of financial structure. All point estimates are positive and differ significantly from zero; 
aside from model (4), even at the one percent level. The positive sign indicates that more 
market-based economies have significantly higher venture capital ratios; i. e. financing seed 
money and start-ups by venture capital is significantly more prevalent in market-based 
economies. Of the other explanatory variables only the number of potential entrepreneurs is 
significant across all specifications in Table 3. It is interesting to find that a higher number of 
potential entrepreneurs actually lowers venture capital finance for dynamic young firms. The 
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significantly negative sign across different specifications and estimators shows that the 
increase in search costs implied by a larger pool of projects weighs down the venture capital 
ratio. An alternative reason for this result may be the imprecise measure of potential 
entrepreneurs that we use. Instead of the unobservable number of potential entrepreneurs with 
interesting business projects we use the whole universe of graduates including those without a 
venture. Several other explanatory variables are significant but only for one of the two 
estimators, i. e. either for PT- or HT-estimators. In general the PT-estimator rejects the null 
hypothesis of zero for the respective parameter more often. The HT-estimator is more 
demanding and rejects the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient among the additional 
explanatory variables only in the case of the business confidence indicator. The positive sign 
hints at higher venture capital ratios during favorable business climates, a result also 
confirmed by Gompers and Lerner (1998). The PT-estimator shows a highly significant 
negative impact from opportunity wages and the time needed to start a business on the 
venture capital ratio. This is to be expected because higher wages in alternative jobs reduce 
the incentive to engage in risky activities with a small probability of success (Cochrane, 2005; 
Lerner, 2009, p. 79). On the other hand, entrepreneurship promotion and the corporate tax rate 
are supportive to venture capital finance, which seems reasonable with respect to promotion 
activities but this coefficient changes if we use the larger sample (model 3). The positive sign 
for the high corporate tax rate may indicate some tax avoidance, i. e. redefining investment 
project as tax-favored ventures, but this result is not supported by HT-estimated models. A 
change of sign occurs for R&D tax subsidies. The small sample provides evidence for a 
negative relation whereas the large sample supports a positive relation between tax subsidies 
and the venture capital ratio.  
Overall, Table 3 provides no clear-cut evidence on the relation between policy instruments 
and the venture capital ratio. This might be due to an omitted interaction between the financial 
market structure of a country and the choice by public policymakers to implement specific 
economic policy instruments more or less intensively. For example, countries with 
predominantly bank-based financial markets may decide to compensate for the missing 
venture capital market by increasing their direct R&D subsidies. This would result in a 
negative correlation between the financial market structure and direct R&D-subsidies which 
in a multivariate regression may result in a false positive relation between market structure 
and the extent of venture capital finance due to omitted variable bias. Similarly, other policy 
instruments like entrepreneurship promotion and indirect tax subsidies for R&D spending 
could be used in the same compensatory way.  
We account for possible negative correlation between financial market structure and 
economic policy instruments by introducing interaction terms into our regression models. For 
this purpose Table 4 repeats models 1 through 4 from Table 3 but adds interaction terms 
between the financial market structure and three policy instruments to promote venture-
capital-backed finance as suggested by Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2005): tax subsidies, direct 
R&D subsidies, and entrepreneurship promotion. We try several versions of the HT-estimator 
with only the financial market index being the endogenous variable (models 6 and 8), model 9 
uses additionally the three interaction terms as endogenous variables, and model 10 adds 
direct R&D subsidies to the list of endogenous variables for the HT-estimator. The results of 
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these extensions are mixed again. Whereas the HT-estimator does not reject zero coefficients 
on all interaction terms throughout all specifications, the PT-estimator finds significant 
interaction between financial market structure and entrepreneurship promotion in the small 
sample (model 5) but rejects it in the large sample (model 7). On the other hand, the small 
sample provides no evidence of any interaction between R&D subsidies in general and 
financial market structure, whereas the large sample shows significant interaction. In 
summary, the results on the significance of interaction terms are mixed. Nevertheless, our 
main interest lies with the coefficient for the financial market structure. Each model with 
significant interaction terms still has significant and positive coefficients for the financial 
market structure, although in model (5) the t-statistic for the entrepreneurship promotion 
suggests that the underlying policy instrument for the interaction is insignificant. Similarly, 
the F-test for the joint null hypothesis of a zero coefficient for the financial market structure 
and all related interaction terms remains significantly different from zero, i. e. financial 
structure matters even if we account for the interaction with policy measures intended to 
correct for missing market-based financial structures. Introduction of the interaction terms in 
the HT-estimated models results in a loss of significance for the financial structure, but the 
null hypothesis of no interaction cannot be rejected, thus suggesting that the models in 
Table 3 are the appropriate ones. With respect to our remaining control variables most of the 
results remain valid, though the significance of tax subsidies, business confidence, and 
entrepreneurship promotion switches sometimes in comparison to Table 3.  
To summarize our regression results, after conditioning on a set of theoretically motivated 
variables we find clear evidence in favor of a significant and positive relation between 
financial market structure and the extent of venture capital finance throughout industrial 
countries. More market-based economies tend to have a higher degree of venture-capital-
financed investments. With respect to economic policy variables fostering R&D expenditures 
and entrepreneurship promotion, on the other hand, we cannot provide conclusive results for a 
positive relation with venture capital finance. The following section provides a sensitivity 
analysis of our results.  
5.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to check the robustness of our results we change the regression model in various 
dimensions. First we manipulate the set of explanatory variables. We replace our indicator of 
the number of potential entrepreneurs from the OECD definition to the data on educational 
attainment collected by Barro and Lee (2010). Although graduates in science provide a good 
indicator of the number of potential entrepreneurs for venture deals, data availability for this 
variable reduces the number of observations considerably. Additionally, Becker and 
Hellmann (2005) emphasize that a large number of graduates in and of itself does not imply a 
large potential for venture deals because it is high-quality entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial 
incentives that actually determine the number of potential projects. We cannot account for 
variations in entrepreneurial quality by using the Barro and Lee definition of educational 
attainment, nevertheless, our results with respect to a positive and significant relation between 
financial market structure and venture capital use for seed and start-up finance hold up. Only 
model 4 in Table 3 shows a switch toward insignificance of the financial market structure; on 
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the other hand, in model 10 of Table 4 financial structure becomes significant. Another 
variation is motivated by the crucial assumption in the theoretical model that all additional 
income will be spent only on traditional goods. For this reason demand for goods produced by 
venture-capital-financed firms does not respond to income fluctuations. Since the original 
model for production with monopolistic competition and product diversity by Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) was more general and allowed for a feedback between the demand for 
differentiated goods and income, we add the growth rate of gross national product to the set of 
explanatory variables. Output may also work as a demand-side indicator for project finance, 
which is strongly confirmed by Gompers and Lerner (1998). Adding output to the regression, 
however, lowers the p-value for the financial market structure in model 4 to below 5 percent, 
whereas significance levels in the other models remain unaffected. A possible objection to 
Hausman and Taylor’s approach is the need to specify exogenous variables for identification. 
Chatelain and Ralf (2010) suggest a pretest to check whether those exogeneity assumptions 
are fulfilled. Accordingly, we use the Mundlak (1978) estimator to check for the exogeneity 
of our instrument in models 2, 4, 6 and 8: the corporate tax rate. The relevant p-values for 
bootstrapped t-statistics are in a range between 0.80 and 0.98 indicating that the average 
corporate tax rate is an appropriate instrument for the financial market structure. The resulting 
second stage Hausman and Taylor estimators and their bootstrapped standard deviations are 
almost identical to those presented in Tables 3 and 4.  
As shown in Figure 1 the financial market structure develops slowly over time. In our base 
model we therefore use the average level of the Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) financial 
market structure index from 1989 through 2008. Nevertheless, countries moved slowly 
toward a more market-based system and we are able to replace the constant average value for 
the financial market structure index by underlying yearly values. This perturbation also allows 
us to use more conventional panel estimation techniques like fixed- and random-effects 
models, although these estimators clearly suffer from low variation of explanatory variables 
in the time dimension. Because the variance of the individual mean corrected variable is 
small, the estimate of β is less precise, (cf. also Plümper and Troeger (2007) for Monte Carlo 
evidence of the bad small sample properties in the case of variables that have only small 
variation over time). Our conclusions drawn from Table 3 are confirmed by this variation 
with offsetting switches in significance: in models 5 and 7 the financial market structure 
becomes insignificant; in models 6 and 8, however, the p-value becomes significant.  
Another modification refers to the idea that market- and bank-based finance is complementary 
rather than competitive as stressed by Song and Thakor (2010). The financial market structure 
index by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine has an intrinsic competitive interpretation of market- 
versus bank-based finance, as more stock market activity induces a higher value of the index 
and vice versa for more bank-based finance. In the case of complementary financial markets, 
the positive and significant value of the financial market structure index in Tables 3 and 4 
may merely reflect this complementary relation rather than a positive feedback between 
predominantly market-based finance and the extent of venture capital investment. We 
therefore include an index of complementary financial markets into our regression which we 
base on the components already used by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999), but our index 
increases if market- and bank-based finance is of equal importance and if the degree of 
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external financing is high, cf. the appendix for details of construction. Although our index of 
complementary financial markets is significant in some cases, the original financial market 
structure index by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine remains significant in those cases, further 
supporting our hypothesis that venture capital thrives within market-based financial systems.  
Finally, we eliminate all explanatory variables from the model apart from the financial market 
structure index and estimate this model by using the between estimator to resemble the visual 
impression already provided by Figure 2. Dropping all other variables greatly increases the 
number of available observations toward 278 but leaves the financial structure index firmly 
significant at the 1-percent level.  
The second dimension of our sensitivity analysis refers to characteristics of the errors. We use 
the ratio of seed and start-up venture capital to investments into tangible and intangible 
capital. Since this ratio is bounded between zero and one the corresponding regression error 
cannot be normally distributed. For this reason we apply a logit transformation to the venture 
capital ratio which expands the domain of the dependent variable from [0, 1] to [-∞, +∞] and 
thus theoretically allows for disturbances from the full domain of the normal distribution. We 
do not expect to achieve fundamentally different results from this step because standard errors 
in Tables 3 and 4 are already computed by bootstrap methods. Actually, our conclusion on the 
significance of the financial structure index does not change in any of the models. As a 
second variation in our endogenous variable we use GDP as the denominator to compute the 
venture capital ratio instead of our combined investments into tangible and intangible capital. 
This resembles the more common normalization for international comparisons of venture 
capital activity. Again our results with respect to the significance of the financial structure 
remain unchanged. Another potential source of wrong inference is outliers in the data. 
Figure 2 shows that Canada has the highest venture capital ratio, exceeding even the US value 
by about 50 percent. This surprisingly high value might be due to errors in data collection and 
may bias our estimates but, after eliminating Canada from the sample, our conclusion remains 
the same. A further step in this direction would be to eliminate the USA as well from the 
sample, because the US venture capital market is exceptional and may bias our results toward 
a significant positive relation between venture capital finance and market-based financial 
systems. Figure 2 already points to this possibility. But, even after eliminating North 
American data from the sample, our financial structure index remains significantly positive, in 
most of the models at the 1-percent level. Finally, we also use asymptotic standard errors for 
the computation of test statistics and our results are again confirmed without exception.  
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we study the relation between financial market structure and the extent of 
venture capital activity in the seed and start-up phase. The literature suggests two channels for 
a positive relation between market-based financial systems and venture capital investment. 
Allen and Gale (1999) stress the advantage of financial markets over bank-based systems in 
aggregating diverse opinions on the same information set. As the future of young innovative 
firms is highly uncertain, market-based systems are better at aggregating the spectrum of the 
investors’ subjective expectations about the business development of an innovative firm. 
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Black and Gilson (1998) emphasize the transfer of control rights between entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists. By accepting finance and advice from the venture capitalist, entrepreneurs 
usually transfer control rights to the venture capitalist. Fixing an initial public offering (IPO) 
as the preferred route of exit already in the venture capital contract allows both parties to 
create an implicit contract about the eventual return of control rights to the entrepreneur. 
Additionally, the venture capitalist’s reputation acts as a positive signal for potential 
investors. Megginson and Weiss (1990) show that US venture capitalists actually keep a 
majority of their share holdings in the post-IPO period in order to send this signal. Norbäck 
and Persson (2009), on the other hand, suggest that venture capitalists are able to extract rents 
from incumbent oligopolists by supporting innovative projects that put the oligopoly rent at 
risk. This strategy, however, uses acquisitions by the incumbent oligopolist as the mode of 
exit and does not necessarily need well-functioning financial markets.  
Our results confirm previous anecdotal evidence collected by Black and Gilson (1998) and a 
cross-country comparison by Jeng and Wells (2000). We use a set of comparable data for a 
sample of 19 countries and we are able to prove that market-based systems are more 
conducive to venture capital. Specifically, we estimate a series of panel regressions and find a 
significant contribution of the Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) financial market structure 
index in explaining differences across countries with respect to venture capital investment: 
market-based economies show, on average, significantly higher venture capital investment. 
Interestingly, adding other potential determinants for the extent of venture capital as 
suggested by economic theory substantiates our result.  
The positive relation between market-based financial systems and venture capital investment 
raises important policy issues. Our findings support policy recommendations formulated by 
Lerner (2009) with respect to creating or improving local public stock markets for young 
firms. Well-functioning public markets improve the possibilities to exit from an investment, 
which in turn allows entrepreneurs to regain their highly valued independence from venture 
capitalists. It also allows venture capitalists and investors alike to realize capital gains from a 
venture. Affecting both sides of the market at the same time, public markets increase the 
probability of deals in the beginning and thus back up a virtuous circle. Our results support 
the conjecture that implementing and enhancing public markets at the local level is an 
important policy challenge. The route to take innovative young firms public on major 
international stock markets like London or NASDAQ, as proposed by Black and Gilson 
(1998) as an alternative to liquid local markets, is subject to several barriers. Advanced and 
liquid markets have higher regulatory standards, may ask for different book-keeping rules, 
and foremost widen the already existing informational asymmetry between investors and 
entrepreneurs by using different national judicial systems, languages and so on. Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) and French and Poterba (1991) show that even less risky aggregates like gross 
fixed capital formation and equity investments are subject to cross-border barriers (home 
equity bias). This phenomenon will be more pronounced for innovative young venture 
investments.  
A further argument in favor of local markets arises from a strategic interaction perspective. 
The European Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (Easdaq) was launched 
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in 1994 as a pan-European public market for young and growing companies. But EASDAQ 
was never able to establish a liquid and efficient market for high technology firms. Only a few 
dozen firms were listed on the exchange until 2003, when it was closed (Lerner, 1995B). This 
failure was due in part to the general start-up problems of financial markets: at the beginning 
only a few firms are listed on a stock market and the transaction volume is small. The high 
degree of illiquidity deters other firms from listing and a deadlock may set in if the exchange 
is unable to attract more companies to list. A more relevant cause for the failure of EASDAQ 
was the fierce competition from local exchanges that set in after the foundation of EASDAQ. 
Equity markets for young and small firms sprang up at the national level in France (1996: 
Nouveau Marché), Germany (1997: Neuer Markt), Italy (1999: Nuovo Mercato), and Spain 
(2000: Nuevo Mercado) among others. The stated goal of these ‘new markets’ was to 
facilitate the access of small- and medium-sized firms to an equity market but essentially it 
was a strategic move on the part of local exchanges to avoid losing the lucrative domestic 
market of potentially very successful IPOs to EASDAQ.  
Although many of the new markets already ceased to exist they improved the possibilities for 
IPOs of young and innovative firms at second-tier segments of local exchanges and thus 
enhanced the general conditions for future venture capital investments. Becker and Hellman 
(2005) argue that establishing a well-functioning stock market requires a number of additional 
institutional changes that go beyond founding a new special market segment or a stock 
exchange. For instance, if the prospective venture capitalists face difficulty in acquiring 
control rights in the first place, the ease of exit offered by a stock market will not, by itself, 
make the market attractive. On the other hand, the media coverage of successful firms listed 
on the Neuer Markt in Germany improved the general attitude toward entrepreneurship in 
Germany (Becker and Hellman, 2005) and thus also had positive secondary effects.  
To sum up, although well-developed domestic stock markets for young and innovative firms 
are not a sufficient condition for a successful venture capital industry, they are significantly 
and positively related to venture capital activity. We conclude from our empirical results that 
creating vibrant local stock markets for publicly traded firms produces favorable conditions 
for venture-capital financed seed and start-up investments.  
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Table 1: List of variables and sample descriptive statistics
Observations Mean Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Venture capital ratio 267 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.031
Financial market structure 361 0.000 0.368 -0.423 1.195
Potential entrepreneurs 172 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.009
Insolvencies 266 90.353 63.482 1.112 299.000
Cost of start-up 114 6.167 7.012 0.000 32.000
Tax subsidies 379 0.126 0.210 -0.054 1.000
Direct R&D subsidies 300 7.936 4.431 1.237 26.396
Business Confidence 380 99.885 2.865 87.100 105.800
Wages 367 -3.858 0.415 -5.023 -2.875
Time to start business 114 20.702 19.573 2.000 114.000
Entrepreneurship promotion 357 118.189 307.997 0.000 2752.960
Corporate tax rate 399 3.052 1.076 1.527 6.667
Notes: Data available as an incomplete panel for 19 countries over 1989 through 2008. The 
countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, and the USA. For sources and definition of variables see Table A1. 
Table 2: Correlations across variables
Venture 
capital 
ratio
Wages Corporate 
tax rate
Cost of 
start-up
Time to 
start 
business
Business 
Confi-
dence
Direct 
R&D 
subsidies
Financial 
market 
structure
Tax 
subsidies
Insol-
vencies
Potential 
entre-
preneurs
Entrepre-
neurship 
promotion
Venture capital ratio 1.00
Wages 0.20 1.00
Corporate tax rate -0.07 0.44 1.00
Cost of start-up -0.26 -0.37 -0.14 1.00
Time to start business -0.12 -0.33 -0.27 0.27 1.00
Business Confidence -0.14 0.02 0.30 -0.05 -0.11 1.00
Direct R&D subsidies -0.04 -0.07 0.08 0.34 0.12 0.17 1.00
Financial market structure 0.19 0.20 -0.10 -0.37 -0.03 -0.07 0.01 1.00
Tax subsidies -0.02 -0.09 0.24 0.26 -0.10 0.03 0.53 -0.20 1.00
Insolvencies -0.11 0.06 -0.19 -0.37 0.28 0.08 -0.06 -0.13 -0.42 1.00
Potential entrepreneurs 0.22 0.07 0.13 -0.44 -0.36 -0.11 -0.22 0.28 -0.07 -0.22 1.00
Entrepreneurship promotion -0.13 -0.10 -0.29 0.19 0.15 0.07 0.06 -0.26 -0.08 0.02 -0.33 1.00
S: Own calculations.
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Model 1 2 3 4
PT HT PT HT
Financial Market Structure 0.0036 *** 0.0054 *** 0.0065 *** 0.0111 ***
Potential entrepreneurs -0.4690 *** -0.4380 * -0.8020 *** -0.8040 **
Insolvencies1) -0.0021 0.0014 0.0145 -0.0084
Cost of start-up1) -0.1060 -0.1650 - -
Tax subsidies -0.0009 * -0.0008 0.0039 ** 0.0038
Direct R&D subsidies1) 0.1700 0.0868 -1.8800 ** -1.6800
Business Confidence1) -0.4760 -0.6190 1.5300 * 1.3600 **
Wages -0.0046 *** -0.0028 -0.0067 *** -0.0034
Time to start business1) -0.0746 *** -0.0785 - -
Entrepreneurship promotion1) 0.0027 ** 0.0033 -0.0113 *** -0.0093
Corporate Tax Rate 0.0009 *** 0.0006 0.0009 *** 0.0006
Eta 1.0000 *** - 1.0000 *** -
Constant -0.0115 *** -0.0026 -0.0371 *** -0.0221 *
Observations 73 73 128 128
Ramsey test p-value 0.48 0.33 0.59 0.90
R-squared 0.92 - 0.50 -
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator 
and PT stands for Plümper and Troeger estimator. Eta is the residual from the second stage 
regression in the PT procedure. Standard errors are bootstrapped. *** indicates significance at the 1 
percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, * indicates significance at the 10 
percent level. - 1) For better visibility the coefficient is multiplied by a factor 10,000.
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Table 3: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression 
results 
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Model 5 6 7 8 9 10
PT HT PT HT HT HT
Financial Market Structure 0.0029 *** 0.0009 0.0094 *** 0.0064 0.0047 0.0049
Potential entrepreneurs -0.4740 *** -0.4020 * -0.7860 *** -0.7280 * -0.4420 * -0.4480 **
Insolvencies1) 0.0034 0.0018 0.0203 -0.0140 0.0089 0.0081
Cost of start-up1) -0.1260 -0.3230 - - -0.2260 -0.2070
Tax subsidies -0.0003 0.0012 0.0137 *** 0.0109 ** 0.0011 0.0008
Direct R&D subsidies1) 0.3410 0.3450 -2.7600 ** -1.3500 0.1120 0.2370
Business Confidence1) -0.4570 -0.7180 1.6600 * 1.3100 -0.6080 -0.5760
Wages -0.0049 *** -0.0019 -0.0093 *** -0.0026 -0.0030 -0.0032
Time to start business1) -0.0966 *** -0.0873 - - -0.1040 -0.1020
Entrepreneurship promotion1) -0.0059 -0.0022 0.0196 -0.0194 -0.0045 -0.0052
Interaction with tax subs. 0.0024 0.0090 0.0503 *** 0.0434 0.0078 0.0068
Interaction with R&D subs.1) 0.7920 1.1400 -5.7900 *** -4.0200 0.5280 0.7200
Interaction with promotion1) -0.0373 -0.0195 0.1200 -0.0367 -0.0332 -0.0359
Corporate Tax Rate 0.0009 *** 0.0004 0.0011 *** 0.0002 0.0007 0.0007
Eta 1.0000 *** - 1.0000 *** - - -
Constant -0.0130 *** 0.0023 -0.0493 *** -0.0178 -0.0038 -0.0047
Observations 73 73 128 128 73 73
Ramsey test p-value 0.54 0.89 0.00 0.43 0.14 0.13
R-squared 0.92 - 0.52 - - -
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and PT stands for 
Plümper and Troeger estimator. Eta is the residual from the second stage regression in the PT procedure. Standard 
errors are bootstrapped. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent 
level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level.  Interactions between Financial market structure and three policy 
instruments (tax subsidies, direct R&D subsidies, and entrepreneurship promotion programs) included. - 1) For better 
visibility the coefficient is multiplied by a factor 10,000.
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Table 4: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression results with policy 
interaction terms
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Figure 1: Financial market structure index during the 1990s and 2000s 
 
S: Own computations according to Demirguç-Kunt and Levine (1999) with current Worldbank data from “A New Database 
on Financial Development and Structure” (Beck, Demirguç-Kunt and Levine, 2000). Dots show average values over the 
periods given on the respective axis. Dots above the 45-degree line indicate a development toward a more market-based 
financial system whereas dots below the 45 degree line show a movement toward a more bank-based system.  
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Figure 2: The extent of venture capital finance and financial market structure 
 
Notes: The venture capital ratio is venture capital investments into seed and start-up projects over tangible and intangible 
capital formation. The financial market structure index by Demirguç -Kunt and Levine (1999) increases with the extent of 
market-based financial transactions. Dots show average values from 1990 through 2008.  
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Appendix: Construction of the index of complementary financial markets 
and data sources:  
The measure for financial market structure suggested by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) is 
a continuous number increasing in the extent of market-based finance of domestic firms. The 
index compares the level of financial activity channeled through the stock market to that 
facilitated by private banks. The index combines deposits at banks, DB, private credit by 
banks, PCB, overhead costs of banks, OCB, the stock market capitalization, SMC, and the 
stock market total traded value, SMT, into an index number. The first two components of the 
index are the ratio of the stock market capitalization to deposits at banks, Ait, and the ratio of 
the stock market total traded value to private credit by banks, Bit:  
 
it
it
it DB
SMCA =  
it
it
it PCB
SMTB =
. 
 
Both components are computed for each country i and year t. Furthermore, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine (1999) use the ratio of bank overhead costs to total assets of banks and multiply it 
by the stock market total traded value to GDP ratio to compute the third component, Cit:  
 
it
it
it
it
it GDP
SMT
TAB
OCBC =
. 
 
Then all three components, Ait, Bit, and Cit are mean corrected by subtracting the mean over all 
countries and years, cf. in the case of the stock market capitalization to deposit at banks ratio 
we obtain:  
 ( )..AAa itit −= , 
where A.. represent the mean of Ait across countries and years. Finally, the index of financial 
market structure, IFMSit, is computed as the average of the three components:  
 ( ) 3itititit cbaIFMS ++= .  
A higher value of this index clearly indicates a higher degree of market-based finance for 
country i. In order to obtain a measure of complementary financial markets we rearrange the 
first two components of the index by Demirgurc-Kunt and Levine such that those components 
increase if marked and bank-based characteristics within a country are balanced. Specifically, 
we compute products rather than ratios between marked- and bank-based variables and 
normalize all variables with respect to GDP to make numbers comparable across countries:  
 
it
it
it
it
it GDP
SMC
GDP
DBA =*  
it
it
it
it
it GDP
SMT
GDP
PCBB =*  
The modified ratios achieve a maximum value if market- and bank based finance are of equal 
size, reflecting the idea of complementary rather than competitive financial markets. The third 
indicator, Cit, does not have a similar reinterpretation; we therefore take Cit as in Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine. Again we subtract means across countries and years from the modified 
components, making the index of complementary finance, ICit, increasing in the size of 
financial markets within country i relative to the sample average:  
 ( ) 3** itititit cbaIC ++= .  
We use the current release of the World Bank dataset to compute our index of complementary 
financial markets.  
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Table A1: Description and source of variables
Full name Source and links Description
OECD-Monthly Economic Indicators
http://stats.oecd.org/
OECD, Revenue Statistics, comparative 
table database
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataS
etCode=REV
Cost of start-up World Bank, Doing Business project 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
Cost to register a business normalized as a percentage of 
gross national income (GNI) per capita.
OECD, Main Science and Technology 
Indicators
http://stats.oecd.org/
OECD Labor market Programs database
http://stats.oecd.org/OECDStat_Metadat
a/ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=LMPEX
P&ShowOnWeb=true&Lang=en
World Bank "A new Database on 
Financial Development and Structure"
http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0
OECD, Main Economic Indicators
http://stats.oecd.org/OECDStat_Metadat
a/ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=REFSERI
ES&Coords=[SUBJECT].[GDPA]&Show
OnWeb=true&Lang=en
Eurostat, OECD Annual National 
Accountshttp://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/, 
http://stats.oecd.org/. 
Australia: Insolvency and Trustee 
Service Australia, Canada: Office of the 
Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Europe: 
Creditreform, USA: American 
Bankruptcy Institute. 
 CreditReform 
http://www.creditreform.de/Deutsch/Cred
itreform/Presse/Creditreform_Wirtschaft
sforschung/Insolvenzen_in_Europa/
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cf
m?Section=Business_Bankruptcy_Filings
1&Template=/TaggedPage/TaggedPageD
isplay.cfm&TPLID=59&ContentID=36
301
Office of the Superintendent of 
Bankruptcy Canada, 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-
http://www.itsa.gov.au/dir228/itsaweb.nsf
//docindex/about+us-%3Epublications-
%3Eannual+reports
Insolvencies Insolvency ratios, number of insolvencies per 10,000 
companies. US: American bankruptcy Institute: US 
bankruptcy fillings (1980-2009), number of bankruptcy 
divided by the number of business firms (multiplied by 
10,000, own computation). Australia: Annual report  by the 
Inspection General in bankruptcy on the operation of the 
bankruptcy Act 2008, p15. absolute value divided by the 
number of Australian firms multiplied by 10,000 (own 
computation). 
Business confidence Confidence indicator based on industrial confidence surveys
Direct  R&D subsidies Percentage of business expenditures on R&D financed by 
government. 
Corporate tax rate Revenue of taxes on capital gains and corporate profits as 
percentage of GDP.
Programs promoting entrepreneurship by encouraging the 
unemployed and target groups to start their own business or 
to become self-employed. “Most measures take the form of 
continued payment of unemployment benefit  during the 
start-up of a business”. Management support with various 
definitions in the different countries, Eurostat  LMP 
publication, p24-75. In millions of Euros, real. For non-
Euro-members at  constant exchange rates from year 2000.
Gross domestic product Logarithm of gross domestic product (expenditure 
approach), in millions of Euros, real, for non-Euro-
members at constant  exchange rates from year 2000. 
Financial market structure Index developed by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) to 
separate bank- and market-based economies. Own 
computation by following Demirguc-Kunt and Levine’s 
methodology for the period 1990 to 2008.
Investment spending Gross fixed capital formation, i.e. investment into 
structures and equipment. In millions of national currency. 
Entrepreneurship 
promotion
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Table A1 – Description and sources of variables, continued  
 
  
GDP deflator OECD Economic Outlook No 86: 
Annual and Quarterly data
National accounts deflator for gross domestic product.
Population, total US Census Bureau, International 
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/group
s.php
OECD Education and Training 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSet
Code=RGRADSTY
Potential entrepreneurs, share 
OECD
Own computation based on OECD 
measure
Number of potential entrepreneurs (tertiary graduates) 
divided by total population aged 20 to 64. 
Barro and Lee (2010) educational 
attainment dataset by 5 year age group, 
http://www.barrolee.com/
Potential entrepreneurs, share 
Barro - Lee
Own computation based on Barro and 
Lee (2010) measure.
Number of potential entrepreneurs (tertiary graduates) 
divided by total population aged 20 to 64. 
Tax subsidies OECD
http://www.oecd.org/sti/scoreboard/
T ime to start business World Bank, Doing Business project 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/
T ime required to start  a business is the number of calendar 
days needed to complete the procedures to legally operate a 
business. If a procedure can be speeded up at  additional cost , 
the fastest  procedure, independent of cost , is chosen.
Venture capital deals AVCAL, CVCA, EVCA, and NVCA 
(various yearbooks)1)
Number of the Venture Capital seed and start-up deals 
signed. In millions.
Venture capital investments AVCAL, CVCA, EVCA, and NVCA 
(various yearbooks)1)
Amount of venture capital invested for seed money and 
start-ups. Real value, in millions of Euros (year 2000).
Venture capital ratio Own computation Numerator: Amount of venture capital seed and start-up 
investments, denominator: Gross fixed capital formation 
amended by entrepreneur’s wage (number of venture capital 
deals times the average wage, see above).
Wages OECD Tax Database, T able 1-5. 
www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase/ 
Logarithm of net per capita wage for earners receiving 
133% of the average wage (after social security 
contributions and income tax). In millions of Euros. For 
non-Euro-members at  constant exchange rates from year 
2000.
Notes: 1) National venture capital associations of Australia, Canada, Europe und the USA. Real values are computed by applying GDP-
deflators. 
Number of males and females aged between 20 to 64 years, 
in millions.
Potential entrepreneurs, 
OECD
Graduates with tert iary education in business administration, 
life sciences, physical sciences, mathematics and statist ics, 
computing, engineering and engineering trades, 
manufacturing and processing. In millions. 
Various scoreboards (STI).  The B index is equal to the after-
tax cost of USD 1 spend on R&D divided by one minus the 
corporate income tax rate. We use 1 minus the B-index as 
the indicator. 
Potential entrepreneurs, 
Barro-Lee
Number of persons with completed tertiary education in age 
groups 25 and older.
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.25
 34 
 
 
  
Model 1 2 3 4
PT HT PT HT
Potential entrepreneurs -0.0189 *** -0.0172 0.0144 *** 0.0059
(0.0000) (0.1820) (0.0025) (0.8460)
Insolvencies1) -0.0071 -0.0044 -0.1030 *** -0.1170 *
(0.6170) (0.8490) (0.0008) (0.0960)
Cost of start-up1) 0.2660 ** 0.2150 - -
(0.0442) (0.7500) - -
Tax subsidies -0.0017 *** -0.0015 0.0009 0.0016
(0.0054) (0.2580) (0.4850) (0.5800)
Direct R&D subsidies 0.0001 *** 0.0001 -0.0002 *** -0.0002
(0.0000) (0.3180) (0.0008) (0.1650)
Business Confidence1) -0.3860 -0.5070 -0.5770 -0.6790
(0.1960) (0.2990) (0.6040) (0.4720)
Wages -0.0038 *** -0.0026 -0.0009 0.0010
(0.0000) (0.3090) (0.1250) (0.8540)
Time to start business1) -0.0817 *** -0.0815 - -
(0.0009) (0.2550) - -
Entrepreneurship promotion1) 0.0034 *** 0.0041 -0.0082 ** -0.0075
(0.0025) (0.6950) (0.0327) (0.6100)
Financial Market Structure 0.0045 *** 0.0072 * 0.0013 * 0.0027
(0.0000) (0.0710) (0.0558) (0.7560)
Corporate Tax Rate 0.0007 *** 0.0006 -0.0003 ** -0.0005
(0.0000) (0.5530) (0.0413) (0.7330)
Eta 1.0000 *** - 1.0010 *** -
(0.0000) - (0.0000) -
Constant -0.0077 ** -0.0017 0.0055 0.0156
(0.0147) (0.8760) (0.6300) (0.5150)
Observations 75 75 168 168
R-squared 0.92 - 0.45 -
Number of countries - 19 - 19
Table A2: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression 
results with an alternative measure for potential entrepreneurs
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and 
PT stands for Plümper and Troeger estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors 
are bootstrapped. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 
percent level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. Potential Entrepreneurs in Tables 3 and 4 
are tertiary graduates in basic sciences. Barro and Lee (2010) provide number for tertiary students in 
arts, business administration, and sciences. The period covered by Barro and Lee is longer and allows 
higher degrees of freedom. 1) For better visibility the coefficient is multiplied by a factor 10,000. 
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
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Model 5 6 7 8 9 10
PT HT PT HT HT HT
Potential entrepreneurs -0.0213 *** -0.0137 0.0174 *** 0.0108 -0.0190 -0.0195
(0.0000) (0.3100) (0.0008) (0.7320) (0.1230) (0.1460)
Insolvencies1) -0.0087 -0.0070 -0.0541 * -0.0909 ** -0.0043 -0.0050
(0.5650) (0.8100) (0.0656) (0.0385) (0.8750) (0.9020)
Cost of start-up1) 0.2050 0.0440 - - 0.0127 0.0159
(0.1120) (0.9530) - - (0.8940) (0.8690)
Tax subsidies -0.0016 * 0.0008 0.0015 0.0022 0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0662) (0.8370) (0.3910) (0.7390) (0.9850) (0.9590)
Direct R&D subsidies 0.0001 *** 0.0001 -0.0002 ** -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0023) (0.6100) (0.0348) (0.6910) (0.7300) (0.5730)
Business Confidence1) -0.3900 -0.6280 -0.7180 -0.7410 -0.5070 -0.4510
(0.3110) (0.1740) (0.5470) (0.5220) (0.3460) (0.3370)
Wages -0.0037 *** -0.0016 -0.0040 *** 0.0002 -0.0027 -0.0030
(0.0000) (0.6130) (0.0000) (0.9700) (0.4130) (0.3270)
Time to start business1) -0.0741 -0.0704 - - 0.0000 0.0000
(0.1270) (0.3470) - - (0.3460) (0.5180)
Entrepreneurship promotion1) 0.0095 * 0.0060 -0.0024 -0.0299 0.0085 0.0072
(0.0991) (0.9540) (0.9320) (0.6390) (0.9690) (0.9670)
Interaction with tax subs. 0.0006 0.0101 0.0040 0.0047 0.0068 0.0057
(0.8710) (0.5640) (0.4880) (0.8740) (0.7570) (0.8320)
Interaction with R&D subs.1) -1.7400 * 0.4430 -3.1800 ** -3.0800 -1.2500 -0.9890
(0.0938) (0.9380) (0.0363) (0.5120) (0.8360) (0.8610)
Interaction with promotion1) 0.0257 0.0126 0.0197 -0.0947 0.0188 0.0141
(0.2550) (0.9780) (0.8650) (0.8200) (0.9830) (0.9930)
Financial Market Structure 0.0060 *** 0.0021 0.0051 ** 0.0040 0.0081 0.0089 *
(0.0000) (0.6620) (0.0139) (0.4350) (0.2080) (0.0654)
Corporate Tax Rate 0.0006 *** 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0000) (0.8170) (0.4390) (0.7510) (0.5410) (0.3470)
Eta 1.0000 *** - 1.0000 *** - - -
(0.0000) - (0.0000) - - -
Constant -0.0063 * 0.0037 -0.0073 0.0115 -0.0016 -0.0034
(0.0973) (0.7820) (0.5510) (0.6670) (0.9070) (0.8100)
Observations 75 75 168 168 75 75
R-squared 0.92 - 0.47 - - - -
Number of countries - 19 - 19 19 19
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and PT stands for Plümper and 
Troeger estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors are bootstrapped. *** indicates significance at the 1 
percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. Potential Entrepreneurs 
in Tables 3 and 4 are tertiary graduates in basic sciences. Barro and Lee (2010) provide number for tertiary students in arts, business 
administration, and sciences. The period covered by Barro and Lee is longer and allows higher degrees of freedom. Interactions 
between Financial market structure and three policy instruments (tax subsidies, direct R&D subsidies, and entrepreneurship 
promotion programs) included. - 1) For better visibility the coefficient is multiplied by a factor 10,000. 
Table A3: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression results with policy 
interactions and an alternative measure for potential entrepreneurs
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
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Model 1 2 3 4
PT HT PT HT
Potential entrepreneurs -578.0000 *** -508.0000 *** -385.9000 *** -343.5000 *
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0558)
Insolvencies 0.0018 0.0018 0.0007 0.0003
(0.1560) (0.4410) (0.5170) (0.8380)
Cost of start-up -0.0049 -0.0181 - -
(0.7100) (0.7410) - -
Tax subsidies -0.0010 -0.1200 1.5420 *** 1.5470 *
(0.9980) (0.9120) (0.0015) (0.0563)
Direct R&D subsidies -0.0338 * -0.0272 -0.0281 -0.0324
(0.0786) (0.3830) (0.1160) (0.4230)
Business Confidence -0.0244 -0.0413 0.0273 0.0186
(0.3070) (0.2060) (0.3300) (0.6190)
Wages -3.4740 *** -2.6400 -1.5380 *** -1.6090
(0.0000) (0.1380) (0.0000) (0.1060)
Time to start business -0.0110 *** -0.0105 ** - -
(0.0000) (0.0195) - -
Entrepreneurship promotion1) 2.3300 *** 2.8400 -5.3100 *** -4.6600
(0.0000) (0.5880) (0.0000) (0.3090)
Financial Market Structure 2.9240 *** 4.4310 ** 2.028*** 4.3890 **
(0.0000) (0.0301) (0.0000) (0.0179)
Corporate Tax Rate 0.5710 *** 0.5180 -0.0018 0.1370
(0.0000) (0.2780) (0.9760) (0.7490)
Eta 1.0000 *** - 1.0000 *** -
(0.0000) - (0.0000) -
Constant -16.6600 *** -11.9000 -13.6000 *** -13.6400 **
(0.0000) (0.2220) (0.0000) (0.0249)
Observations 72 72 127 127
R-squared 0.94 - 0.76 -
Number of countries - 19 - 19
Table A4: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression results 
with logit transformed venture capital ratio
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and PT 
stands for Plümper and Troeger estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors are 
bootstrapped. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level. The logit transformation expands the domain of the dependent 
variable from [0, 1] to [-∞, +∞] which corresponds to the domain of the normal distribution. - 1) For better 
visibility the coefficient is multiplied by a factor 10,000. 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.25
 37 
 
 
  
Model 5 6 7 8 9 10
PT HT PT HT HT HT
Potential entrepreneurs -579.1000 *** -456.9000 *** -397.8000 *** -322.0000 * -503.2000 *** -512.2000 ***
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0880) (0.0001) (0.0005)
Insolvencies 0.0018 0.0015 0.0010 0.0000 0.0020 0.0019
(0.1510) (0.4640) (0.3930) (0.9900) (0.3760) (0.3600)
Cost of start-up -0.0108 -0.0416 - - -0.0276 -0.0251
(0.3210) (0.5760) - - (0.7250) (0.6860)
Tax subsidies 1.5170 *** 2.129 4.3740 *** 3.9520 * 2.0330 1.927
(0.0058) (0.4490) (0.0000) (0.0599) (0.4910) (0.4970)
Direct R&D subsidies -0.0166 -0.0091 -0.0704 *** -0.0374 -0.0240 -0.0184
(0.3360) (0.8990) (0.0000) (0.6260) (0.7590) (0.8290)
Business Confidence -0.0246 -0.0563 ** 0.0324 0.0159 -0.0434 -0.0403
(0.3130) (0.0239) (0.2350) (0.6500) (0.1130) (0.2380)
Wages -3.4710 *** -1.871 -1.8430 *** -1.0720 -2.646 -2.743
(0.0000) (0.1660) (0.0000) (0.2340) (0.1130) (0.1030)
Time to start business -0.0116 *** -0.0100 - - -0.0114 ** -0.0114 **
(0.0000) (0.3150) - - (0.0293) (0.0412)
Entrepreneurship promotion 0.0001 0.0004 0.0015 ** 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001
(0.8710) (0.9240) (0.0125) (0.8460) (0.9130) (0.9400)
Interaction with tax subs. 5.9900 ** 9.825 13.6800 *** 13.54 8.689 8.266
(0.0247) (0.5910) (0.0000) (0.1570) (0.6330) (0.5460)
Interaction with R&D subs. 0.1430 ** 0.1030 -0.0607 -0.0326 0.0908 0.1060
(0.0113) (0.5860) (0.2250) (0.8930) (0.7590) (0.7670)
Interaction with promotion -0.0007 0.0005 0.0086 *** 0.0039 -0.0004 -0.0006
(0.7020) (0.9900) (0.0006) (0.6610) (0.9650) (0.9620)
Financial Market Structure 1.4320 *** 0.5810 1.9110 *** 1.315 3.136 3.284
(0.0004) (0.7970) (0.0000) (0.3860) (0.3260) (0.2470)
Corporate Tax Rate 0.5630 *** 0.2640 0.0044 -0.0613 0.4690 0.4940
(0.0000) (0.5930) (0.9510) (0.9060) (0.3030) (0.4410)
Eta 1.0000 *** - 1.000* *** - - -
(0.0000) - (0.0000) - - -
Constant -16.8100 *** -7.0130 -15.3000 *** -10.9400 * -11.69 -12.45
(0.0000) (0.3350) (0.0000) (0.0731) (0.1670) (0.1820)
Observations 72 72 127 127 72 72
R-squared 0.94 - 0.77 - - -
Number of countries - 19 - 19 19 19
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Table A5: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression results with policy interactions and 
logit transformed venture capital ratio
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and PT stands for Plümper and Troeger 
estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors are bootstrapped. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** 
indicates significance at the 5 percent level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. The logit transformation expands the domain of 
the depended variable from [0, 1] to [-∞, +∞] which corresponds to the domain of the normal distribution. Interactions between Financial 
market structure and three policy instruments (tax subsidies, direct R&D subsidies, and entrepreneurship promotion programs) included.
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Model 1 2 3 4 5
FE RE FE RE BE
Potential entrepreneurs -0.4520 ** -0.1900 -0.8120 ** -0.3960 -
(0.0275) (0.2310) (0.0352) (0.1100) -
Insolvencies1) -0.0079 -0.0253 0.0737 -0.0401 -
(0.8230) (0.4550) (0.4200) (0.5420) -
Cost of start-up1) -0.0999 -0.5330 - - -
(0.8400) (0.1940) - - -
Tax subsidies -0.0009 -0.0011 0.0027 0.0031 -
(0.4220) (0.3350) (0.4230) (0.2460) -
Direct R&D subsidies1) 0.1810 0.4940 -0.9320 -0.9250 -
(0.8210) (0.4630) (0.6400) (0.4700) -
Business Confidence1) -0.4010 -1.3100 *** 0.9360 -0.0292 -
(0.4140) (0.0091) (0.4540) (0.9800) -
Wages -0.0046 * -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0000 -
(0.0944) (0.7550) (0.9300) (0.9760) -
Time to start business1) -0.0768 -0.0547 - - -
(0.2610) (0.4320) - - -
Entrepreneurship promotion1) 0.0028 -0.0001 -0.0163 -0.0108 -
(0.6290) (0.9820) (0.1180) (0.2010) -
Financial Market Structure1) -3.4800 2.7300 45.2000 *** 37.8000 *** 19.0000 *
(0.5910) (0.6300) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0501)
Corporate Tax Rate - -0.0001 - -0.0003 -
- (0.8840) - (0.6160) -
Constant -0.0096 0.0152 ** -0.0062 0.0053 0.0018 ***
(0.4270) (0.0181) (0.8030) (0.6980) (0.0000)
Observations 72 72 122 122 258
R-squared 0.33 - 0.28 - 0.21
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. FE represents the fixed effects estimator and RE the random effects 
estimator. HT stands for Hausman and Taylor estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors are 
bootstrapped. Standard errors are bootstrapped. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 
5 percent level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. Estimation chosen according to Hausman-tests. The financial 
market structure index is available for every year. Due to the small degree of variation over time, tables 3 and 4 use time 
averages for each country. In this table we allow for time variation. - 1) For better visibility the coefficient is multiplied by a 
factor 10,000.
Table A6: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression results with time variable 
financial structure index
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Model 5 6 7 8
FE RE FE RE
Potential entrepreneurs -0.4570 ** -0.0820 -0.7900 ** -0.3550
(0.0325) (0.4480) (0.0431) (0.1630)
Insolvencies1) -0.0045 -0.1010 *** 0.0698 -0.0128
(0.9140) (0.0031) (0.4460) (0.8490)
Cost of start-up1) -0.1250 -1.2900 *** - -
(0.8150) (0.0001) - -
Tax subsidies 0.0000 0.0012 0.0156 * 0.0092 **
(0.9980) (0.4550) (0.0674) (0.0247)
Direct R&D subsidies1) 0.4110 0.5840 -1.6600 -0.3260
(0.7140) (0.2580) (0.4770) (0.8130)
Business Confidence1) -0.3680 -2.6200 *** 0.9400 -0.1030
(0.4760) (0.0002) (0.4540) (0.9280)
Wages -0.0048 0.0000 -0.0020 -0.0008
(0.1070) (0.9890) (0.7230) (0.6330)
Time to start business1) -0.0972 -0.0569 - -
(0.3010) (0.4820) - -
Entrepreneurship promotion1) -0.0049 -0.0150 -0.0075 -0.0668
(0.8480) (0.3460) (0.9040) (0.1190)
Interaction with tax subs. 0.0037 0.0122 * 0.0601 * 0.0388**
(0.8270) (0.0833) (0.0946) (0.0419)
Interaction with R&D subs.1) 1.3100 -1.8100 -1.2100 -3.5500
(0.7300) (0.1170) (0.7850) (0.0971)
Interaction with promotion1) -0.0330 -0.0408 0.0336 -0.2300
(0.7610) (0.5230) (0.8970) (0.1890)
Financial Market Structure -0.0004 0.0010 0.0043 *** 0.0042 ****
0.5730 0.1790 0.0001 0.0000
Corporate Tax Rate1) - -4.7300 ** - -3.2700
- (0.0176) - (0.5890)
Constant -0.0109 0.0314 *** -0.0127 0.0025
(0.4010) (0.0000) (0.6210) (0.8570)
Observations 72 122 74 158
R-squared 0.32 - 0.34 -
Number of countries 19 19 19 19
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Table A7: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression results 
with policy interaction variables and time variable financial structure index
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. FE represents the fixed effects estimator and RE the 
random effects estimator. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and PT stands for Plümper and 
Troeger estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors are bootstrapped. *** indicates 
significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, * indicates significance at 
the 10 percent level. Estimation chosen according to Hausman-tests. The financial market structure index is 
available for every year. Due to the small degree of variation over time, tables 3 and 4 use time averages for 
each country. In this table we allow for time variation. Interactions between Financial market structure and 
three policy instruments (tax subsidies, direct R&D subsidies, and entrepreneurship promotion programs) 
included. - 1) For better visibility the coefficient is multiplied by a factor 10,000. 
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Model 1 2 3 4
PT HT PT HT
Potential entrepreneurs -0.3500 *** -0.3340 ** -0.5190 *** -0.6060 *
(0.0000) (0.0432) (0.0002) (0.0761)
Insolvencies1) -0.0044 0.0007 0.0074 -0.0008
(0.8260) (0.9860) (0.8080) (0.9880)
Cost of start-up1) 0.0087 -0.0302 - -
(0.9570) (0.9670) - -
Tax subsidies -0.0009 * -0.0010 0.0039 *** 0.0032
(0.0746) (0.4500) (0.0100) (0.1650)
Direct R&D subsidies1) 0.1420 0.2090 -1.8700 *** -1.3300
(0.5840) (0.8450) (0.0003) (0.3090)
Business Confidence1) -0.6460 ** -0.7380 0.9010 0.9160
(0.0141) (0.2440) (0.3260) (0.1100)
Wages -0.0053 *** -0.0031 -0.0087 *** -0.0044
(0.0000) (0.2930) (0.0000) (0.2100)
Time to start business1) -0.0791 *** -0.0773 - -
(0.0005) (0.3140) - -
Entrepreneurship promotion1) 0.0029 *** 0.0034 -0.0106 ** -0.0097
(0.0069) (0.8010) (0.0313) (0.5350)
Financial Market Structure 0.0038 *** 0.0052 ** 0.0067 *** 0.0111 ***
(0.0000) (0.0234) (0.0000) (0.0011)
Corporate Tax Rate 0.0009 *** 0.0006 0.0011 *** 0.0007
(0.0000) (0.4810) (0.0000) (0.7060)
Eta 1.0000 *** - 1.0000 *** -
(0.0000) - (0.0000) -
Constant -0.0133 *** -0.0032 -0.0400 *** -0.0230
(0.0008) (0.8280) (0.0005) (0.1780)
Observations 69 69 122 122
R-squared 0.92 - 0.50 -
Number of countries - 18 - 18
Table A8: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression results 
excluding Canada
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Notes: Sample includes 18 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and 
PT stands for Plümper and Troeger estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors are 
bootstrapped. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent 
level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. As Figure 2 indicates Canada as a potential outlier, 
the models in this table repeat Table 3 but eliminate all observations from Canada. - 1) For better 
visibility the coefficient is multiplied by a factor 10,000.
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Model 5 6 7 8 9 10
PT HT PT HT HT HT
Potential entrepreneurs -0.3540 *** -0.3120 * -0.4930 *** -0.5680 *** -0.3390 ** -0.3400 **
(0.0000) (0.0899) (0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0296) (0.0450)
Insolvencies1) 0.0039 0.0047 0.0125 -0.0069 0.0088 0.0087
(0.8350) (0.9300) (0.6320) (0.8570) (0.7970) (0.7180)
Cost of start-up1) -0.0307 -0.1300 - - -0.0689 -0.0688
(0.8650) (0.9350) - - (0.9330) (0.9260)
Tax subsidies 0.0001 0.0000 0.0142 *** 0.0108 0.0000 0.0000
(0.8570) (0.9990) (0.0000) (0.0990) (0.9950) (0.9960)
Direct R&D subsidies1) 0.2670 0.5130 -2.6900 ** -1.3400 0.2470 0.2450
(0.2220) (0.7290) (0.0112) (0.4090) (0.8730) (0.7960)
Business Confidence1) -0.6310 ** -0.8020 1.0200 0.9090 -0.7270 -0.7240
(0.0383) (0.1970) (0.2040) (0.2570) (0.2550) (0.1530)
Wages -0.0057 *** -0.0024 -0.0115 *** -0.0041 -0.0034 -0.0035
(0.0000) (0.2420) (0.0000) (0.2710) (0.1630) (0.2080)
Time to start business1) -0.1100 *** -0.0948 - - -0.1050 -0.1050
(0.0000) (0.2540) - - (0.3420) (0.2170)
Entrepreneurship promotion1) -0.0084 * -0.0063 0.0155 -0.0112 -0.0067 -0.0067
(0.0588) (0.9220) (0.5320) (0.8330) (0.9400) (0.8910)
Interaction with tax subs. 0.0042 0.0048 0.0529 *** 0.0429 0.0043 0.0043
(0.3100) (0.8170) (0.0000) (0.1420) (0.8300) (0.8480)
Interaction with R&D subs.1) 0.5890 0.9310 -5.9100 ** -4.2500 0.1600 0.1670
(0.5680) (0.8800) (0.0286) (0.5200) (0.9740) (0.9530)
Interaction with promotion1) -0.0490 ** -0.0391 0.0993 -0.0048 -0.0434 -0.0434
(0.0119) (0.9250) (0.3600) (0.9850) (0.9400) (0.8930)
Financial Market Structure 0.0033 *** 0.0015 0.0096 *** 0.0068 * 0.0051 0.0051
(0.0005) (0.6370) (0.0003) (0.0705) (0.2400) (0.2300)
Corporate Tax Rate 0.0010 *** 0.0005 0.0013 *** 0.0004 0.0007 0.0007
(0.0000) (0.6450) (0.0002) (0.7590) (0.4750) (0.4440)
Eta 1.0000 *** - 1.0000 *** - - -
(0.0000) - (0.0000) - - -
Constant -0.0155 *** 0.0004 -0.0528 *** -0.0212 -0.0048 -0.0049
(0.0003) (0.9630) (0.0001) (0.2580) (0.7280) (0.7140)
Observations 69 69 122 122 69 69
R-squared 0.92 - 0.53 - - -
Number of countries - 18 - 18 18 18
Table A9: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression results with policy interaction terms 
excluding Canada
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Notes: Sample includes 18 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and PT stands for Plümper and Troeger 
estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors are bootstrapped. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** 
indicates significance at the 5 percent level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. As Figure 2 indicates Canada as a potential 
outlier, the models in this table repeat Table 3 but eliminate all observations from Canada.  Interactions between Financial market structure 
and three policy instruments (tax subsidies, direct R&D subsidies, and entrepreneurship promotion programs) included. - 1) For better 
visibility the coefficient is multiplied by a factor 10,000.
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Model 1 2 3 4
PT HT PT HT
Potential entrepreneurs -0.3680 *** -0.3470 ** -0.5000 *** -0.5490 **
(0.0000) (0.0365) (0.0000) (0.0133)
Insolvencies1) -0.0039 -0.0019 -0.0211 -0.0374
(0.7910) (0.9500) (0.5040) (0.2180)
Cost of start-up1) -0.0172 -0.0729 - -
(0.8850) (0.9150) - -
Tax subsidies -0.0008 -0.0010 0.0031 *** 0.0027
(0.1280) (0.3530) (0.0072) (0.3700)
Direct R&D subsidies1) 0.0715 0.2540 -0.8930 -0.2910
(0.7740) (0.7930) (0.1340) (0.7490)
Business Confidence1) -0.6800 * -0.7940 1.2800 1.2900
(0.0754) (0.1870) (0.1050) (0.0535)
Wages -0.0051 *** -0.0026 -0.0053 *** -0.0026
(0.0000) (0.3280) (0.0000) (0.4400)
Time to start business1) -0.0809 ** -0.0759 - -
(0.0158) (0.2650) - -
Entrepreneurship promotion1) 0.0031 *** 0.0032 -0.0117 *** -0.0106 **
(0.0068) (0.7280) (0.0082) (0.0195)
Financial Market Structure 0.0039 *** 0.0058 ** 0.0042 *** 0.0163 ***
(0.0000) (0.0477) (0.0000) (0.0057)
Corporate Tax Rate1) 8.9000 *** 4.8200 4.9300 *** 0.8010
(0.0000) (0.3510) (0.0051) (0.9390)
Eta 1.0000 *** - 1.0000 *** -
(0.0000) - (0.0000) -
Constant -0.0121 ** -0.0001 -0.0297 *** -0.0178
(0.0120) (0.9940) (0.0013) (0.2740)
Observations 64 64 113 113
R-squared 0.90 - 0.55 -
Number of countries - 17 - 17
Notes: Sample includes 17 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and PT 
stands for Plümper and Troeger estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors are 
bootstrapped. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent 
level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. As Figure 2 indicates Canada and the USA as  
potential outliers the models in this table repeat Table 4 and  eliminate all observations from Canada and 
the USA. - 1) For better visibility the coefficient is multiplied by a factor 10,000.
Table A10: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression results 
excluding Canada and the USA
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
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Model 5 6 7 8 9 10
PT HT PT HT HT HT
Potential entrepreneurs -0.3660 *** -0.3230 ** -0.5630 *** -0.5700 ** -0.3500 -0.3530 **
(0.0000) (0.0418) (0.0000) (0.0381) (0.1030) (0.0346)
Insolvencies1) 0.0062 0.0048 -0.0209 -0.0315 0.0064 0.0073
(0.6400) (0.9180) (0.4160) (0.3920) (0.8890) (0.8460)
Cost of start-up1) -0.0738 -0.1590 - - -0.1190 -0.1290
(0.5870) (0.8350) - - (0.9000) (0.8590)
Tax subsidies -0.0002 0.0001 0.0131 *** 0.0110 * -0.0002 0.0000
(0.7920) (0.9900) (0.0000) (0.0812) (0.9680) (0.9950)
Direct R&D subsidies1) -0.3180 0.2200 -4.3300 *** -2.6200 -0.0060 -0.1150
(0.5120) (0.9240) (0.0002) (0.2220) (0.9980) (0.9710)
Business Confidence1) -0.7080 * -0.8600 1.1300 1.1400 -0.8050 -0.8180
(0.0577) (0.2260) (0.1880) (0.1280) (0.2880) (0.1800)
Wages -0.0056 *** -0.0024 -0.0085 *** -0.0037 -0.0030 -0.0030
(0.0000) (0.3400) (0.0000) (0.4030) (0.3420) (0.2510)
Time to start business1) -0.1050 *** -0.0954 - - -0.0985 -0.1000
(0.0012) (0.3660) - - (0.2370) (0.4580)
Entrepreneurship promotion1) -0.0030 -0.0045 0.0480 * 0.0195 -0.0032 -0.0029
(0.6560) (0.9490) (0.0900) (0.8070) (0.9600) (0.9490)
Interaction with tax subs. 0.0027 0.0051 0.0494 *** 0.0431 0.0036 0.0040
(0.5580) (0.8600) (0.0000) (0.2060) (0.8500) (0.8380)
Interaction with R&D subs. -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0015 *** -0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.4340) (0.9680) (0.0012) (0.2310) (0.8860) (0.9100)
Interaction with promotion1) -0.0272 -0.0326 0.2320 ** 0.1220 -0.0286 -0.0278
(0.2920) (0.9250) (0.0450) (0.7850) (0.9490) (0.8880)
Financial Market Structure 0.0050 *** 0.0029 0.0099 *** 0.0080 0.0068 0.0070
(0.0007) (0.5090) (0.0000) (0.1860) (0.1570) (0.2000)
Corporate Tax Rate 0.0010 *** 0.0005 0.0009 *** 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0000) (0.4190) (0.0000) (0.7790) (0.4870) (0.5510)
Eta 1.0000 *** - 1.0000 *** - - -
(0.0000) - (0.0000) - - -
Constant -0.0135 *** 0.0012 -0.0406 *** -0.0211 -0.0015 -0.0014
(0.0036) (0.9290) (0.0004) (0.3090) (0.9280) (0.9030)
Observations 64 64 113 113 64 64
R-squared 0.91 - 0.60 - - -
Number of countries - 17 - 17 17 17
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Table A11: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression results with policy interaction 
terms excluding Canada and USA
Notes: Sample includes 17 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and PT stands for Plümper 
and Troeger estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors are bootstrapped. *** indicates significance at 
the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. As Figure 2 
indicates Canada and the USA as  potential outliers the models in this table repeat Table 4 and  eliminate all observations 
from Canada and USA. - 1) For better visibility the coefficient is multiplied by a factor 10,000.
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Model 1 2 3 4
PT HT PT HT
Potential entrepreneurs -0.4820 *** -0.4470 ** -0.4250 *** -0.5210
(0.0000) (0.0295) (0.0087) (0.1610)
Insolvencies1) 0.0010 0.0036 0.0425 0.0090
(0.9530) (0.9050) (0.3200) (0.9090)
Cost of start-up1) -0.0206 -0.0838 - -
(0.8990) (0.8960) - -
Tax subsidies -0.0009 ** -0.0009 0.0048 ** 0.0047
(0.0364) (0.5790) (0.0238) (0.2460)
Direct R&D subsidies1) 0.0766 0.0284 -2.4700 *** -1.7200
(0.7050) (0.9670) (0.0072) (0.3630)
Business Confidence1) -0.0008 -0.2080 -1.9900 * -1.5600
(0.9980) (0.7680) (0.0919) (0.4920)
Wages -0.0048 *** -0.0030 -0.0041 *** -0.0015
(0.0000) (0.3010) (0.0000) (0.6270)
Time to start business1) -0.0924 *** -0.0928 - -
(0.0002) (0.1490) - -
Entrepreneurship promotion1) 0.0036 *** 0.0038 -0.0118 ** -0.0067
(0.0030) (0.4040) (0.0170) (0.7860)
GDP -0.0131 ** -0.0111 0.0873 *** 0.0748
(0.0131) (0.5570) (0.0027) (0.1920)
Financial Market Structure 0.0038 *** 0.0055 * 0.0045 *** 0.0077 *
(0.0000) (0.0641) (0.0000) (0.0581)
Corporate Tax Rate 0.0009 *** 0.0007 0.0003 0.0002
(0.0000) (0.5160) (0.2530) (0.8800)
Eta 1.0000 *** - 1.0000 *** -
(0.0000) - (0.0000) -
Constant -0.0167 *** -0.0073 0.0065 0.0122
(0.0003) (0.6700) (0.5750) (0.5440)
Observations 73 73 128 128
R-squared 0.92 - 0.53 -
Number of countries - 19 - 19
Table A12: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression 
results including gross domestic product
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and 
PT stands for Plümper and Troeger estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors are 
bootstrapped. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent 
level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. The general model for demand in Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1973) has a link between income and demand for the differentiated product. A generalized version of 
equation (20) therefore may include income. - 1) For better visibility the coefficient is multiplied by a 
factor 10,000. 
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Models 5 6 7 8 9 10
PT HT PT HT HT HT
Potential entrepreneurs -0.4950 *** -0.418* * -0.3120 ** -0.3810 -0.4560 ** -0.4630 **
(0.0000) (0.0564) (0.0237) (0.2720) (0.0464) (0.0127)
Insolvencies1) 0.0085 0.0044 0.0553 * 0.0274 0.0122 0.0117
(0.5030) (0.8970) (0.0781) (0.7150) (0.6860) (0.7550)
Cost of start-up1) -0.0362 -0.2500 - - -0.1400 -0.1150
(0.8220) (0.8100) - - (0.8670) (0.8910)
Tax subsidies 0.0002 0.0012 0.0156 *** 0.0125 ** 0.0013 0.0010
(0.8260) (0.8270) (0.0000) (0.0221) (0.8060) (0.8370)
Direct R&D subsidies1) 0.4070 * 0.3350 -3.4000 *** -1.5200 0.1350 0.2740
(0.0757) (0.8670) (0.0053) (0.5740) (0.9250) (0.8550)
Business Confidence1) 0.1140 -0.3790 -2.5900 ** -2.5500 -0.1270 -0.0721
(0.8100) (0.5240) (0.0348) (0.3750) (0.8270) (0.9130)
Wages -0.0051 *** -0.0021 -0.0073 *** -0.0019 -0.0033 -0.0035
(0.0000) (0.4770) (0.0000) (0.6780) (0.3680) (0.2040)
Time to start business1) -0.1270 *** -0.1010 - - -0.1250 -0.1250
(0.0000) (0.2960) - - (0.2050) (0.1970)
Entrepreneurship promotion1) -0.0087 -0.0026 0.0066 -0.0402 -0.0055 -0.0066
(0.1570) (0.9690) (0.8280) (0.7810) (0.9780) (0.8660)
Interaction with tax subs. 0.0043 0.0089 0.0560 *** 0.0473 0.0089 0.0079
(0.2750) (0.6480) (0.0000) (0.1490) (0.6920) (0.7510)
Interaction with R&D subs.1) 1.8000 * 1.4200 -8.8000 ** -6.9900 1.1300 1.4000
(0.0503) (0.8560) (0.0083) (0.4810) (0.8630) (0.7670)
Interaction with promotion1) -0.0532 * -0.0237 0.0628 -0.1340 -0.0401 -0.0445
(0.0531) (0.9760) (0.6250) (0.8520) (0.9670) (0.7910)
GDP -0.0153 ** -0.0087 0.1060 *** 0.1020 -0.0128 -0.0133
(0.0369) (0.6000) (0.0004) (0.1100) (0.4500) (0.5020)
Financial Market Structure 0.0024 *** 0.0009 0.0096 *** 0.0073 0.0044 0.0046
(0.0029) (0.8300) (0.0001) (0.2770) (0.3560) (0.3160)
Corporate Tax Rate 0.0010 *** 0.0004 0.0005 ** -0.0001 0.0007 0.0007
(0.0000) (0.6030) (0.0366) (0.9650) (0.5730) (0.5130)
Eta 1.0000 *** - 1.0000 *** - - -
(0.0000) - (0.0000) - - -
Constant -0.0197 *** -0.0018 -0.0018 0.0198 -0.0095 -0.0107
(0.0009) (0.9080) (0.8660) (0.5570) (0.6100) (0.4890)
Observations 73 73 128 128 73 73
R-squared 0.92 - 0.56 - - -
Number of countries - 19 - 19 19 19
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Table A13: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression results with policy interactions 
terms including Gross Domestic Product
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and PT stands for Plümper and 
Troeger estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors are bootstrapped. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent 
level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. The general model for demand in 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1973) allows for a link between income and demand for the differentiated product. A generalized version of equation 
(20) therefore may include income.  Interactions between Financial market structure and three policy instruments (tax subsidies, direct 
R&D subsidies, and entrepreneurship promotion programs) included. - 1) For better visibility the coefficient is multiplied by a factor 
10,000.
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Model 1 2 3 4
PT HT PT HT
Potential entrepreneurs -0.4690 *** -0.4380 *** -0.8020 *** -0.8040 ***
(0.0000) (0.0090) (0.0000) (0.0098)
Insolvencies1) -0.0021 0.0014 0.0145 -0.0084
(0.8970) (0.9640) (0.7460) (0.9200)
Cost of start-up1) -0.1060 -0.1650 - -
(0.5070) (0.7000) - -
Tax subsidies -0.0009 -0.0008 0.0039 ** 0.0038
(0.1050) (0.4180) (0.0391) (0.2210)
Direct R&D subsidies1) 0.1700 0.0868 -1.8800 ** -1.6800
(0.4140) (0.9010) (0.0121) (0.3140)
Business Confidence1) -0.4760 -0.6190 1.5300 1.3600
(0.1370) (0.1470) (0.1470) (0.2680)
Wages -0.0046 *** -0.0028 * -0.0067 *** -0.0034
(0.0000) (0.0710) (0.0000) (0.2350)
Time to start business1) -0.0746 ** -0.0785 - -
(0.0414) (0.2030) - -
Entrepreneurship promotion1) 0.0027 ** 0.0033 -0.0113 ** -0.0093
(0.0479) (0.5130) (0.0455) (0.3650)
Financial Market Structure 0.0036 *** 0.0054 ** 0.0065 *** 0.0111 **
(0.0000) (0.0229) (0.0000) (0.0177)
Corporate Tax Rate1) 8.5700 *** 6.4700 8.7700 ** 6.3100
(0.0000) (0.3130) (0.0213) (0.5730)
Eta 1.0000 *** - 1.0000 *** -
(0.0000) - (0.0000) -
Constant -0.0115 *** -0.0026 -0.0371 *** -0.0221
(0.0059) (0.7600) (0.0030) (0.2330)
Observations 73 73 128 128
R-squared 0.92 - 0.50 -
Number of countries - 19 - 19
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Table A14: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression 
results with asymptotic standard errors
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and 
PT stands for Plümper and Troeger estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors are 
asymptotic values. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 
percent level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. - 1) For better visibility the coefficient is 
multiplied by a factor 10,000. 
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Model 5 6 7 8 9 10
PT HT PT HT HT HT
Potential entrepreneurs -0.4740 *** -0.4020 ** -0.7860 *** -0.7280 ** -0.4420 ** -0.4480 ***
(0.0000) (0.0162) (0.0000) (0.0163) (0.0101) (0.0092)
Insolvencies1) 0.0034 0.0018 0.0203 -0.0140 0.0089 0.0081
(0.8550) (0.9580) (0.6610) (0.8630) (0.7960) (0.8130)
Cost of start-up1) -0.1260 -0.3230 - - -0.2260 -0.2070
(0.4650) (0.4600) - - (0.6160) (0.6480)
Tax subsidies -0.0003 0.0012 0.0137 *** 0.0109 * 0.0011 0.0008
(0.6430) (0.7040) (0.0000) (0.0531) (0.7550) (0.8260)
Direct R&D subsidies1) 0.3410 0.3450 -2.7600 *** -1.3500 0.1120 0.2370
(0.1330) (0.6880) (0.0013) (0.4470) (0.9030) (0.8040)
Business Confidence1) -0.4570 -0.7180 * 1.6600 1.3100 -0.6080 -0.5760
(0.1840) (0.0975) (0.1210) (0.2720) (0.1650) (0.1890)
Wages -0.0049 *** -0.0019 -0.0093 *** -0.0026 -0.0030 * -0.0032 *
(0.0000) (0.2030) (0.0000) (0.3550) (0.0723) (0.0693)
Time to start business1) -0.0966 ** -0.0873 - - -0.1040 -0.1020
(0.0146) (0.2660) - - (0.2010) (0.2060)
Entrepreneurship promotion1) -0.0059 -0.0022 0.0196 -0.0194 -0.0045 -0.0052
(0.4940) (0.9170) (0.5550) (0.7250) (0.8370) (0.8120)
Interaction with tax subs. 0.0024 0.0090 0.0503 *** 0.0434 * 0.0078 0.0068
(0.4620) (0.4510) (0.0000) (0.0891) (0.5520) (0.6090)
Interaction with R&D subs.1) 0.7920 1.1400 -5.7900 ** -4.0200 0.5280 0.7200
(0.3710) (0.6770) (0.0191) (0.3340) (0.8630) (0.8160)
Interaction with promotion1) -0.0373 -0.0195 0.1200 -0.0367 -0.0332 -0.0359
(0.2800) (0.8240) (0.3740) (0.8730) (0.7180) (0.6970)
Financial Market Structure 0.0029 *** 0.0009 0.0094 *** 0.0064 0.0047 0.0049
(0.0000) (0.7630) (0.0000) (0.1930) (0.2070) (0.2040)
Corporate Tax 0.0009 *** 0.0004 0.0011 *** 0.0002 0.0007 0.0007
(0.0000) (0.5070) (0.0067) (0.8820) (0.3270) (0.3340)
Eta 1.0000 *** - 1.0000 *** - - -
(0.0000) - (0.0000) - - -
Constant -0.0130 *** 0.0023 -0.0493 *** -0.0178 -0.0038 -0.0047
(0.0051) (0.7810) (0.0003) (0.3160) (0.6800) (0.6140)
Observations 73 73 128 128 73 73
R-squared 0.92 - 0.52 - - -
Number of countries - 19 - 19 19 19
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Table A15: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression results with policy interactions 
and asymptotic standard errors
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and PT stands for Plümper and 
Troeger estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors are asymptotic values. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent 
level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level.  Interactions between Financial 
market structure and three policy instruments (tax subsidies, direct R&D subsidies, and entrepreneurship promotion programs) included. 
- 1) For better visibility the coefficient is multiplied by a factor 10,000.
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Model 1 2 3 4
PT HT PT HT
Potential entrepreneurs -0.0513 *** -0.0482 *** -0.1010 *** -0.0998 **
(0.0000) (0.0057) (0.0000) (0.0244)
Insolvencies1) 0.0002 0.0006 0.0031 0.0002
(0.9110) (0.8200) (0.4150) (0.9820)
Cost of start-up1) -0.0179 -0.0271 - -
(0.2940) (0.7270) - -
Tax subsidies -0.0001 ** -0.0001 0.0005 * 0.0004
(0.0293) (0.3460) (0.0864) (0.1140)
Direct R&D subsidies1) 0.0414 0.0267 -0.1970 * -0.1740
(0.1320) (0.7750) (0.0683) (0.4370)
Business Confidence1) -0.0733 ** -0.0921 * 0.2390 ** 0.2160 **
(0.0496) (0.0783) (0.0195) (0.0196)
Wages -0.0006 *** -0.0004 -0.0009 *** -0.0004
(0.0000) (0.2890) (0.0000) (0.3990)
Time to start business1) -0.0142 *** -0.0148 * - -
(0.0000) (0.0978) - -
Entrepreneurship promotion1) 0.0005 *** 0.0005 -0.0014 *** -0.0012
(0.0004) (0.7540) (0.0004) (0.5890)
Financial Market Structure 0.0004 *** 0.0006 ** 0.0008 *** 0.0013 **
(0.0000) (0.0260) (0.0000) (0.0388)
Corporate Tax Rate1) 1.0900 *** 0.7950 1.1800 *** 0.8250
(0.0000) (0.2900) (0.0002) (0.6640)
Eta 1.0000 *** - 1.0000 *** -
(0.0000) - (0.0000) -
Constant -0.0014 *** -0.0002 -0.0052 *** -0.0033
(0.0024) (0.8950) (0.0000) (0.1180)
Observations 73 73 134 134
R-squared 0.91 - 0.47 -
Number of countries - 19 - 19
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Table A16: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression 
results with venture capital to GDP ratio as endogenous variable
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and 
PT stands for Plümper and Troeger estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors are 
asymptotic values. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 
percent level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. A more common normalization of venture 
capital activity is the ratio of venture capital investments to GDP. In this table we use GDP instead of 
investments as the denominator in the venture capital ratio. - 1) For better visibility the coefficient is 
multiplied by a factor 10,000. 
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Model 5 6 7 8 9 10
PT HT PT HT HT HT
Potential entrepreneurs -0.0519 *** -0.0437 * -0.1020 *** -0.0938 * -0.0485 ** -0.0492 **
(0.0000) (0.0713) (0.0001) (0.0669) (0.0232) (0.0269)
Insolvencies1) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0043 -0.0003 0.0009 0.0008
(0.9590) (0.9970) (0.2170) (0.9610) (0.8360) (0.8380)
Cost of start-up1) -0.0203 -0.0478 - - -0.0361 -0.0329
(0.2990) (0.6890) - - (0.6980) (0.7560)
Tax subsidies 0.0000 0.0002 0.0015 *** 0.0013 * 0.0002 0.0001
(0.8050) (0.9570) (0.0000) (0.0656) (0.7770) (0.8490)
Direct R&D subsidies1) 0.0642 *** 0.0473 -0.3620 *** -0.1740 0.0256 0.0457
(0.0057) (0.7860) (0.0073) (0.4170) (0.8690) (0.7270)
Business Confidence1) -0.0717 * -0.1050 * 0.2570 ** 0.2190 ** -0.0921 -0.0871
(0.0916) (0.0676) (0.0442) (0.0257) (0.1650) (0.1260)
Wages -0.0006 *** -0.0002 -0.0011 *** -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0000) (0.3350) (0.0000) (0.5480) (0.3050) (0.2570)
Financial Market Structure 0.0003 ** 0.0001 0.0012 *** 0.0008 0.0004 0.0005
(0.0149) (0.9150) (0.0000) (0.3280) (0.3850) (0.4320)
Time to start business1) -0.0146 *** -0.0135 - - -0.0157 * -0.0155
(0.0000) (0.1710) - - (0.0937) (0.1260)
Entrepreneurship promotion1) 0.0004 0.0009 0.0038 -0.0005 0.0005 0.0004
(0.5930) (0.8870) (0.2450) (0.9510) (0.9810) (0.9100)
Corporate Tax1) 1.0800 *** 0.4320 1.4200 *** 0.2560 0.7360 0.7760
(0.0000) (0.9100) (0.0001) (0.8820) (0.6010) (0.4230)
Interaction with tax subs. 0.0004 0.0012 0.0054 *** 0.0051 * 0.0012 0.0010
(0.3910) (0.8860) (0.0000) (0.0554) (0.6280) (0.6850)
Interaction with R&D subs.1) 0.1700 0.1620 -0.7640 ** -0.4910 0.1200 0.1510
(0.2460) (0.8050) (0.0242) (0.5170) (0.8360) (0.7350)
Interaction with promotion1) -0.0003 0.0024 0.0212 0.0037 0.0002 -0.0002
(0.9030) (0.9330) (0.1340) (0.9400) (0.9980) (0.9970)
Eta 1.0000 *** - 1.0000 *** - - -
(0.0000) - (0.0000) - - -
Constant -0.0014 *** 0.0005 -0.0066 *** -0.0028 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0064) (0.6600) (0.0000) (0.2040) (0.8890) (0.8120)
Observations 73 73 134 134 73 73
R-squared 0.91 - 0.49 - - -
Number of countries - 19 - 19 19 19
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Table A17: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression results with policy interactions 
and venture capital to GDP ratio as endogenous variable
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and PT stands for Plümper and 
Troeger estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors are not bootstrapped. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent 
level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level.  Interactions between Financial 
market structure and three policy instruments (tax subsidies, direct R&D subsidies, and entrepreneurship promotion programs) 
included. In this table we use GDP instead of investments as the denominator in the venture capital ratio. - 1) For better visibility the 
coefficient is multiplied by a factor 10,000.
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Model 2' 4'
Mundlak HT Mundlak HT
Potential entrepreneurs -0.3900 * -0.4310 ** -0.9170 * -0.8050 **
(0.0825) (0.0473) (0.0657) (0.0365)
Insolvencies1) -0.0052 -0.0035 0.0130 -0.0082
(0.8740) (0.9180) (0.8190) (0.8790)
Cost of start-up1) -0.3230 -0.1620 - -
(0.6380) (0.8270) - -
Tax subsidies -0.0013 -0.0009 0.0034 0.0038
(0.4070) (0.6390) (0.3770) (0.1810)
Direct R&D subsidies1) 0.0492 0.1320 -2.7600 -1.6700
(0.9540) (0.8730) (0.1680) (0.2200)
Business Confidence1) -0.3870 -0.5440 1.2500 1.3700 *
(0.5020) (0.3640) (0.1790) (0.0791)
Wages -0.0008 -0.0031 -0.0050 -0.0034
(0.8440) (0.2180) (0.5050) (0.3760)
Time to start business1) -0.1090 -0.0789 - -
(0.1820) (0.4220) - -
Entrepreneurship promotion1) 0.0018 0.0034 -0.0089 -0.0093
(0.9160) (0.9430) (0.6230) (0.7660)
Corporate Tax Rate1)2) -3.7000 ** -0.5560 1.0300 -0.0476
(0.0397) (0.7450) (0.8350) (0.9920)
Financial Market Structure -0.0003 0.0055 *** 0.0023 0.0111 **
(0.9950) (0.0091) (0.8960) (0.0120)
Avg. Potential entrepreneurs 0.3830 - 1.5010 -
(0.9790) - (0.8710) -
Avg. Insolvencies1) -0.2400 - -0.1900 -
(0.9020) - (0.9130) -
Avg. Cost of start-up -0.0002 - - -
(0.7450) - - -
Avg. Tax subsidies -0.0002 - -0.0055 -
(0.9970) - (0.9430) -
Avg. Direct R&D subsidies 0.0002 - 0.0004 -
(0.8900) - (0.8130) -
Avg. Business Confidence 0.0015 - 0.0022 -
(0.9910) - (0.9580) -
Avg. Wages 0.0011 - 0.0062 -
(0.9840) - (0.8870) -
Avg. Time to start business1) 0.3170 - - -
(0.9680) - - -
Avg. Entrepr. promotion1) -0.0311 - -0.0236 -
(0.9660) - (0.9360) -
Avg. Corporate Tax Rate -0.0002 0.0008 -0.0016 0.0006
(0.9840) (0.3320) (0.8790) (0.6360)
Constant -0.1330 -0.0045 -0.2170 -0.0222
(0.9920) (0.7300) (0.9560) (0.2040)
Observations 73 73 128 128
Number of countries 19 19 19 19
Table A18: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression 
results with Mundlak pretest for exogeneity
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and 
Mundlak stands for the Mundlak (1978) first  stage estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard 
errors are bootstrapped. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 
percent level, * indicates significance at  the 10 percent level. - 1) For better visibility the coefficient is 
multiplied by a factor 10,000.  - 2) T ime varying values for corporate tax rate. The time invariant averages 
used in Tables 3 and 4 are in the lower part  of the table. 
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Model 6' 8'
Mundlak HT Mundlak HT
Potential entrepreneurs -0.4020 * -0.4070 * -0.9740 ** -0.7280 *
(0.0625) (0.0600) (0.0265) (0.0542)
Insolvencies1) 0.0045 -0.0026 0.0333 -0.0115
(0.9160) (0.9520) (0.5780) (0.8540)
Cost of start-up1) -0.2160 -0.2990 - -
(0.6720) (0.7220) - -
Tax subsidies 0.0019 0.0007 0.0107 0.0111 **
(0.4170) (0.8820) (0.1590) (0.0468)
Direct R&D subsidies1) -0.2210 0.3620 -4.1400 ** -1.3400
(0.7920) (0.8020) (0.0175) (0.4550)
Business Confidence1) -0.4560 -0.6380 0.5930 1.0900
(0.3800) (0.3810) (0.3790) (0.1440)
Wages -0.0069 ** -0.0022 -0.0044 -0.0024
(0.0126) (0.4190) (0.5220) (0.6380)
Time to start business1) -0.1830 ** -0.0847 - -
(0.0235) (0.4790) - -
Entrepreneurship promotion1) -0.0241 -0.0009 -0.0262 -0.0207
(0.2590) (0.9890) (0.6280) (0.8380)
Interaction with tax subs. 0.0117 0.0074 0.0492 0.0450
(0.2670) (0.7400) (0.1730) (0.2000)
Interaction with R&D subs. 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.5980) (0.8460) (0.5510) (0.5130)
Interaction with promotion1) -0.1210 -0.0154 -0.0518 -0.0409
(0.1690) (0.9790) (0.8940) (0.9280)
Corporate Tax Rate2) -0.0002 0.0000 0.0005 0.0001
(0.2520) (0.8340) (0.2720) (0.7570)
Financial Market Structure 0.0039 *** 0.0012 0.0033 0.0061
(0.0048) (0.7640) (0.9720) (0.2170)
Table A19: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression 
results with policy interactions and Mundlak pretest for exogeneity
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
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Model 6' 8'
Mundlak HT Mundlak HT
Avg. Potential entrepreneurs 0.3690 - 1.5780 -
(0.2620) - (0.8290) -
Avg. Insolvencies1) -0.2510 *** - -0.1400 -
(0.0000) - (0.9240) -
Avg. Cost of start-up -0.0003 *** - - -
(0.0000) - - -
Avg. Tax subsidies -0.0048 * - -0.0103 -
(0.0987) - (0.9100) -
Avg. Direct R&D subsidies 0.0003 *** - 0.0005 -
(0.0005) - (0.9260) -
Avg. Business Confidence 0.0010 * - 0.0011 -
(0.0849) - (0.9820) -
Avg. Wages 0.0064 ** - 0.0045 -
(0.0108) - (0.9040) -
Avg. Time to start business1) 0.4280 *** - -
(0.0032) - -
Avg. Entrepr. promotion1) -0.0376 *** - -0.0331 -
(0.0000) - (0.9180) -
Avg. Int. with tax subs. -0.0254 - -0.0322 -
(0.2930) - (0.9560) -
Avg. Int. with R&D subs. -0.0004 - 0.0002 -
(0.1820) - (0.9880) -
Avg. Int. with promotion1) 0.0224 - -0.1180 -
(0.7660) - (0.9780) -
Avg. Corporate Tax Rate -0.0006 0.0005 -0.0018 0.0000
(0.1850) (0.5720) (0.9280) (0.9760)
Constant -0.0916 0.0003 -0.1140 -0.0148
(0.1230) (0.9810) (0.9820) (0.5150)
Observations 73 73 128 128
Number of countries 19 19 19 19
Table A19 continued: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - 
Regression results with policy interactions and Mundlak pretest for exogeneity
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator 
and Mundlak stands for the Mundlak (1978) first stage estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-
values. Standard errors are bootstrapped. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** 
indicates significance at the 5 percent level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. - 1) For 
better visibility the coefficient is multiplied by a factor 10,000. - 2) Time varying values for 
corporate tax rate. The time invariant averages used in Tables 3 and 4 are in the lower part of the 
table. 
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Model 1 2 3 4
PT HT PT HT
Potential entrepreneurs -0.4690 *** -0.4140 * -0.8020 *** -0.8060 **
(0.0000) (0.0493) (0.0000) (0.0379)
Cost of start-up1) -0.0106 -0.2450 - -
(0.4810) (0.7360) - -
Time to start business1) -0.0075 ** -0.0692 - -
(0.0162) (0.1480) - -
Wages -0.0046 *** -0.0022 -0.0067 *** -0.0043
(0.0000) (0.2170) (0.0000) (0.3320)
Entrepreneurship promotion1) 0.0003 ** 0.0027 -0.0113 *** -0.0083
(0.0164) (0.6090) (0.0059) (0.4390)
Insolvencies1) -0.0002 -0.0030 0.0145 -0.0052
(0.9050) (0.8910) (0.6180) (0.9050)
Tax subsidies -0.0009 -0.0010 0.0039 ** 0.0037
(0.1030) (0.3070) (0.0480) (0.1230)
Direct R&D subsidies1) 0.0170 0.2720 -1.8800 ** -1.5700
(0.5340) (0.6770) (0.0446) (0.2630)
Business confidence1) -0.0476 -0.6850 1.5300 * 1.4100 *
(0.1430) (0.1370) (0.0957) (0.0697)
Financial market complementarity 0.0007 *** 0.0002 0.0007 ** 0.0007
(0.0000) (0.8130) (0.0461) (0.6260)
Financial market structure 0.0029 *** 0.0022 0.0059 *** 0.0109 **
(0.0000) (0.2610) (0.0000) (0.0377)
Corporate tax rate 0.0009 *** 0.0005 0.0009 *** 0.0009
(0.0000) (0.4170) (0.0004) (0.4000)
Eta 1.0000 *** - 1.0000 *** -
(0.0000) - (0.0000) -
Constant -0.0116 *** 0.0007 -0.0372 *** -0.0269
(0.0069) (0.9380) (0.0008) (0.1530)
Observations 73 128 73 128
Number of countries 19 19 19 19
Table A20: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression results 
with financial market complementarity added
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and PT 
stands for Plümper and Troeger estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors are 
asymptotic values. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 
percent level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level. Song and Thakor (2010) argue that market and 
bank based institutions are complements rather than substitutes. We therefore include the variable 
Financial Market Complementarity to take account of this issue (cf. Table A1 for a definition of Financial 
Market Complementarity). - 1) For better visibility the coefficient is multiplied by a factor 10,000. 
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
PT HT PT HT HT HT
Potential entrepreneurs -0.4740 *** -0.4070 -0.7860 *** -0.7240 -0.4520 * -0.4520 **
(0.0000) (0.1090) (0.0000) (0.1700) (0.0739) (0.0304)
Insolvencies1) 0.0034 0.0025 0.0203 -0.0146 0.0112 0.0112
(0.8360) (0.9360) (0.4580) (0.7870) (0.6320) (0.7930)
Cost of start-up1) -0.1260 -0.3320 - - -0.2430 -0.2300
(0.4140) (0.7030) - - (0.7990) (0.7690)
Tax subsidies -0.0003 0.0010 0.0137 *** 0.0113* 0.0009 0.0007
(0.7400) (0.8130) (0.0001) (0.0676) (0.8790) (0.8870)
Direct R&D subsidies1) 0.3410 0.4460 -2.7600 ** -1.4600 0.3110 0.4640
(0.1920) (0.7610) (0.0115) (0.4850) (0.8340) (0.7430)
Business confidence1) -0.4570 -0.6970 1.6600 ** 1.2600 -0.5580 -0.5320
(0.2280) (0.1330) (0.0227) (0.1500) (0.3570) (0.3990)
Wages -0.0049 *** -0.0022 -0.0093 *** -0.0020 -0.0038 -0.0039
(0.0000) (0.3370) (0.0000) (0.6360) (0.1680) (0.1910)
Financial market complementarity 0.0008 *** 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0007 0.0008
(0.0000) (0.7740) (0.3990) (0.8090) (0.5920) (0.5810)
Financial market structure 0.0022 ** 0.0005 0.0092 *** 0.0057 0.0040 0.0041
(0.0188) (0.9080) (0.0014) (0.3070) (0.4320) (0.5030)
Time to start business1) -0.0966 *** -0.0914 - - -0.1160 * -0.1170
(0.0007) (0.1190) - - (0.0879) (0.3100)
Entrepreneurship promotion1) -0.0059 -0.0044 0.0196 -0.0134 -0.0099 -0.0114
(0.4510) (0.9220) (0.4690) (0.9350) (0.6030) (0.9130)
Corporate tax rate 0.0010 *** 0.0005 0.0011 *** 0.0000 0.0009 0.0009
(0.0000) (0.5130) (0.0003) (0.9940) (0.2340) (0.2950)
Interaction with tax subs. 0.0024 0.0086 0.0503 *** 0.0451 0.0073 0.0068
(0.6270) (0.6580) (0.0001) (0.1310) (0.7790) (0.7700)
Interaction with R&D subs.1) 0.7920 1.4500 -5.7900 * -3.4900 1.1700 1.4600
(0.4780) (0.7430) (0.0598) (0.6180) (0.8530) (0.7740)
Interaction with promotion1) -0.0373 -0.0295 0.1200 -0.0085 -0.0572 -0.0633
(0.2450) (0.8840) (0.2790) (0.9940) (0.6810) (0.8870)
ETA 1.0000 *** - 1.0000 *** - - -
(0.0000) - (0.0000) - - -
Constant -0.0131 *** 0.0007 -0.0493 *** -0.0147 -0.0082 -0.0089
(0.0083) (0.9470) (0.0000) (0.4200) (0.4890) (0.5150)
Observations 73 73 128 128 73 73
R-squared 0.92 0.52
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Table A21 continued: Venture capital finance and financial market structure - Regression results 
with policy interactions financial market complementarity added
Dependent variable: Venture capital ratio
Notes: Sample includes 19 industrialized countries. HT represents Hausman and Taylor estimator and PT stands for 
Plümper and Troeger estimator. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Standard errors are asymptotic values. *** indicates 
significance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, * indicates significance at the 10 percent 
level. Song and Thakor (2010) argue that market and bank based institutions are complements rather than substitutes. We 
therefore include the variable Financial Market Complementarity to take account of this issue (cf. Table A1 for a 
definition of Financial Market Complementarity). - 1) For better visibility the coefficient is multiplied by a factor 10,000. 
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